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Abstract
Conventional wisdom says that tariffs are counter-cyclical. We analyze the relation-
ship between business cycles and applied MFN tariffs using a disaggregated product-
level panel dataset covering 72 countries between 2000 and 2011. Strikingly, and counter
to conventional wisdom, we find that tariffs are pro-cyclical. Further investigation re-
veals that this pro-cyclicality is driven by the tariff setting behavior of developing coun-
tries; tariffs are acyclical in developed countries. We present evidence that pro-cyclical
market power drives the pro-cyclicality of tariffs in developing countries, providing
further evidence of the importance of terms of trade motivations in explaining trade
policy.
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1 Introduction
Conventional wisdom echoes the introduction of Bagwell and Staiger (2003, p.1): Empirical
studies have repeatedly documented the countercyclical nature of trade barriers. Indeed, this
is a long-held view in both the economics and political science literature; see, for example,
Takacs (1981, p.687), Gallarotti (1985, p.157), Cassing et al. (1986, p.843), Rodrik (1995,
p.687), Costinot (2009, p.1011) and Bown and Crowley (2013a, p.50). While recent empirical
evidence by Knetter and Prusa (2003), Bown and Crowley (2013a) and Bown and Crowley
(2014) has supported the idea that temporary trade barriers are counter-cyclical, recent
empirical evidence by Gawande et al. (2014), Kee et al. (2013) and Rose (2013) suggests
instead that applied tariffs are acyclical.
As argued by Bagwell and Staiger (2003, p.1), the theoretical basis for the conventional
wisdom on the counter-cyclicality of protection is opaque. The standard explanation is that
recessions cause import-competing firms to lobby harder for protection, and policy makers re-
spond by raising tariffs. However, this ignores the role of lobbying by non-import-competing
sectors that prefer lower tariffs, such as those that export or rely on imported intermediate
inputs, and thus provides no justification for policy makers favoring the interests of import-
competing sectors. Indeed, because of this inherent problem, Bagwell and Staiger (2003)
move away from domestic political economy considerations as an explanation of applied
tariff counter-cyclicality and instead pursue a theory based on terms of trade externalities.
Our paper contributes to the empirical literature questioning the counter-cyclicality of
applied tariffs. We build a product-level dataset covering more than 5000 products and
72 developing and developed countries over the years 2000 to 2011. Completely counter
to the conventional wisdom that applied tariffs are counter-cyclical, we find that applied
tariffs are actually pro-cyclical. Indeed, our results suggest that fluctuations related to the
business cycle represent about 11-12% of the average applied tariff change and thus indicate
a non-trivial, but modest, role for these fluctuations in explaining the temporal pattern of
applied tariffs. The finding that applied tariffs are actually pro-cyclical is robust to the
inclusion of numerous control variables that have recently been emphasized in the empirical
and theoretical literature as important determinants of tariffs. These include market power
at the country-product level, the product-level share of imports sourced from PTA partners,
time-varying import surges at the country-product level, and the volatility of import surges
at the country-product level. Our results are also robust to various measures of the business
cycle and different samples (specifically, excluding the Great Recession or extending the
sample back to the beginning of the HS tariff classification system).
To investigate the driving force behind our result that tariffs are pro-cyclical, we first
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split the sample into developed and developing countries. Importantly, we find that the
pro-cyclicality of applied tariffs in the overall sample is driven by developing countries. In
contrast, applied tariffs in developed countries are acyclical.
The acyclicality of applied tariffs in developed countries is not surprising given the in-
stitutional context. Most developed countries were party to the GATT in 1947. Through
successive negotiating rounds, many developed countries had very low bound tariffs by 1995.
Indeed, in our dataset, 87% of developed country observations are bound and 27% are bound
at 0, while the mean binding overhang is around 5.5% points. This shallow water in the
tariff severely constrains developed countries' ability to adjust applied tariffs over the busi-
ness cycle. Conversely, only 80% of developing country observations are bound and less than
3% bound at 0 with mean binding overhang around 19.5% points. This deep water in the
tariff provides developing countries ample latitude for adjusting applied tariffs. Indeed, as
documented by Nicita et al. (2013, p.5), many developing countries did not negotiate their
tariff bindings during the Uruguay round but rather submitted their tariff binding schedules
after the conclusion of the Uruguay round negotiations.
We further explore the possibility that terms of trade motivations are driving the pro-
cyclicality of applied tariffs in developing countries. Terms of trade motivations imply that a
country with higher market power sets a higher optimal tariff, equal to the inverse elasticity
of export supply, to improve its own terms of trade. One simple mechanism consistent with
pro-cyclical tariffs in this context is pro-cyclical market power: pro-cyclical demand shifts
the import demand curve up onto a more inelastic part of the export supply curve during
booms and, in turn, the importer has more market power and a higher optimal tariff.
We investigate two observable implications to determine whether pro-cyclical tariffs could
indeed be driven by terms of trade motives via a pro-cyclical market power mechanism. First,
to the extent that cross-country variation in product-level market power is large relative to
temporal variation in market power at the country-product level, we expect to observe pro-
cyclical tariffs only for country-product pairs that have a high measure of time invariant
market power. Using the Nicita et al. (2013) estimates of time-invariant market power,
we find strong evidence consistent with this expectation.1 Tariffs are indeed pro-cyclical
in developing countries only for country-product pairs with high values of the Nicita et al.
(2013) time-invariant market power measure.
Second, theoretically, an importer's time-varying market power is proportional to its
share of world imports. If terms of trade motives are driving pro-cyclical tariffs, then we
expect to find temporal tariff fluctuations only in the presence of temporal fluctuations in an
1Nicita et al. (2013) have estimated the elasticity of export supply from the perspective of the importer
at the HS6 product level for over 100 importing countries.
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importer's share of world imports. For developing countries with high time-invariant market
power for a given product, we find strong evidence of this link between world import share
and tariffs.
Finally, we investigate a possible interpretation based on an empirical implication of Bag-
well and Staiger (1990) as identified by Bown and Crowley (2013b). Theoretically, Bagwell
and Staiger (1990) show that temporary applied tariff increases can neutralize an importer's
incentive to exploit terms of trade motivations, and thus prevent a tariff war, when idiosyn-
cratic shocks increase the incentive to act on terms of trade motivations. Bown and Crowley
(2013b) observe a key empirical implication: one should only observe fluctuations in an im-
porter's tariff when both (i) imports are fluctuating and (ii) the export supply elasticity faced
by an importer and the importer's own import demand elasticity are sufficiently inelastic.
That is, a country imposes higher tariffs only if market power is sufficient to activate the
terms of trade motivation but the efficiency costs of imposing the tariff are not too high. We
find strong evidence in the data that the pro-cyclical tariff result in developing countries only
emerges when both criteria are satisfied. The result is thus consistent with the theory that
pro-cyclical imports require temporary tariff increases in order to alleviate terms of trade
pressures and prevent a tariff war.
In exploring pro-cyclical tariffs and their links to terms of trade motives, our paper relates
to the distinct literatures that explore the cyclicality of trade policy and the role played by
terms of trade theory in explaining trade policy. It is closely related to Rose (2013) and
Gawande et al. (2014), both of which find acyclical applied tariffs.2,3 Gawande et al. (2014)
focus on 7 developing countries and analyze the factors influencing how product-level (HS6)
applied tariffs differed in 2009 from the preceding three-year period of 2006-2008. Despite
some heterogeneity across countries, their main conclusion is that any effect of additional
lobbying for higher tariffs by domestic import-competing firms was offset by domestic users of
imported intermediate inputs, an ever-growing group given the rise of vertical specialization
and global fragmentation. Our analysis resembles Gawande et al. (2014) because we use
disaggregated product-level data but differs because we do not restrict our sample to focus
on the Great Recession or on a small subset of developing countries.
2An older literature analyzes the cyclicality of protectionism using pre-World War II, and therefore pre-
GATT and pre-WTO, data (McKeown (1983), Gallarotti (1985) and Hansen (1990)) and data that spans
pre- and post-World War II (Magee and Young (1987), Bohara and Kaempfer (1991a) and Bohara and
Kaempfer (1991b)). These studies generally focus on establishing counter-cyclical applied tariffs in the US,
Germany, and the UK. Those focusing on pre-World War II data consistently find counter-cyclicality while
those with data spanning the war have less consistent findings.
3Interestingly, although they do not emphasize this, the results of Bohara and Kaempfer (1991b) indicate
a pro-cyclical relationship between real GNP and applied tariffs. Rather, the point of their paper is that
macroeconomic variables Granger cause tariffs but not vice-versa.
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Rose (2013) analyzes more than 180 countries over a 40-year period through 2010. He
examines how different business cycle measures relate to various measures of protectionism
including country-level average applied tariffs, multiple measures of temporary trade barri-
ers, and disputes initiated through the WTO. His main finding is straightforward (p.572):
during the post-World War II era, protectionism has not been counter-cyclic. Our analysis
resembles Rose (2013) because our panel dataset spans many years (although the time span
is shorter than that in Rose) and a broad range of countries, but differs because we use
disaggregated product-level data.4 To our knowledge, ours is the first paper to analyze the
cyclicality of applied tariffs after formation of the WTO using a broad range of countries and
disaggregated tariff data. Indeed, when we perform aggregate regressions similar to those
performed by Rose, we find no robust evidence that tariffs are cyclical which is consistent
with Rose's results using aggregate data. Thus, our results suggest that using disaggregated
tariff data can reveal cyclical patterns clouded by aggregation.
In contrast to our paper and the aforementioned recent studies emphasizing that applied
tariffs are not counter-cyclical, others (see Knetter and Prusa (2003), Bown and Crowley
(2013a) and Bown and Crowley (2014)) find that temporary trade barriers (TTBs) are
counter-cyclical.5 This suggests that different mechanisms underlie the cyclicality of TTBs
and applied tariffs. Given our evidence that applied tariff pro-cyclicality is driven by pro-
cyclical market power, one possible explanation is that the conventional wisdom of policy
makers responding to the cyclical preferences of import-competing interests is more impor-
tant for TTBs than applied tariffs. This seems reasonable since the institutional context of
TTBs is designed to respond to the needs of individual import-competing interests while the
context of applied tariff setting accommodates opposing interests of multiple industries both
inside and outside the import-competing sector.
By showing that time-varying market power appears to drive the pro-cyclical applied
tariff behavior observed in developing countries, our paper also contributes to the recent
literature emphasizing the role played by terms of trade theory in explaining trade policy.
This theory asserts that (i) countries exploit their market power (as measured by the inverse
4Kee et al. (2013) compute the overall trade restrictiveness index (OTRI) for over 100 countries in 2008
and 2009. The index is a country-level average tariff that aggregates bilateral applied tariffs and bilateral
anti-dumping duties from the HS6 level using bilateral trade flows and bilateral import demand elasticities.
They find no widespread increase in the OTRI across countries, although a small minority of countries did
experience relatively minor increases because of spikes in applied tariffs and anti-dumping duties.
5Bown and Crowley (2013a) use quarterly data for 5 industrialized countries during the pre-Great Reces-
sion period of 1998-2010 and focus on the effects of unemployment, real bilateral exchange rate appreciation
and GDP growth declines of bilateral trading partners. Bown and Crowley (2014) undertake a similar anal-
ysis using annual, rather than quarterly, data for 13 developing countries between 1995 and 2010. Knetter
and Prusa (2003) use more aggregated data and focus on the effects of real exchange rate appreciation for 4
industrialized countries between 1980 and 1998.
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export supply elasticity) to improve their terms of trade when setting tariffs and (ii) the
purpose of cooperative trade agreements is to internalize the resulting negative terms of
trade externalities.
Various approaches have investigated the role played by the terms of trade theory given
that, according to this theory, cooperative WTO trade agreements should actually eliminate
the imprint of market power on negotiated tariffs. Broda et al. (2008) find that market power
influences unilateral tariff setting by non-WTO members. Bagwell and Staiger (2011) show
that negotiated tariff binding schedules of countries acceding to the WTO exhibit larger
concessions when the importer had larger market power. Ludema and Mayda (2013) show
that the imprint of market power on an importer's applied tariff is stronger when a larger
share of world imports originate from exporters who did not participate in tariff negotiations.
Bown and Crowley (2013b) focus on U.S. temporary trade barriers (TTBs), whose tariffs
are not cooperatively negotiated, and show that the U.S. is more likely to implement a
product-level TTB in years where it has stronger terms of trade motivations.6
Alternatively, recent papers have also investigated the relationship between market power
and binding overhang (i.e. the difference between negotiated tariff bindings and applied
tariffs). In the presence of privately observed political shocks, which create a demand for
tariff flexibility via binding overhang, Beshkar et al. (2015) show that an optimal agreement
assigns lower tariff bindings to countries with higher market power to minimize the magnitude
of realized terms of trade externalities. In turn, as Beshkar et al. (2015) empirically verify,
binding overhang will be lower on products where countries have high market power. Nicita
et al. (2013) show that, empirically, applied tariffs appear cooperative (i.e. negatively related
to market power) when binding overhang is low but non-cooperative (i.e. positively related
to market power) when binding overhang is high.
Like our paper, the duration of trade literature (e.g. Besede² and Prusa (2006)) em-
phasizes the value of looking at temporal patterns in product level trade. Moreover, the
duration literature can add further context to the link between market power, via terms
of trade theory, and pro-cyclical applied tariffs. As is well known in the empirical trade
literature, differentiated goods tend to have higher market power than homogeneous goods
(e.g. Broda et al. (2008)). This suggests that our results may relate more to differentiated
than homogeneous products. The duration literature also shows that differentiated prod-
ucts tend to have longer relationships between exporters and importers. To the extent that
this reduces the export supply elasticity due to the inflexibility imposed by long-term con-
6Nevertheless, Oatley (2015) finds that the real growth rate is positively correlated with, but not a
statistically significant determinant of, the annual number of US anti-dumping petitions stretching back to
the 1960s.
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tracts or exporter-importer relationships, the duration literature provides a complementary
interpretation of the relationship between applied tariffs and market power.
Our analysis of pro-cyclical tariffs in developing countries emphasizes terms of trade mo-
tivations. The resulting international tension between importing and exporting countries
contrasts with the domestic tension between exporting and import-competing sectors under-
lying the conventional wisdom of counter-cyclical tariffs. One variable that partly captures
the domestic distributional implications of applied tariffs is the effective rate of protection.
Indeed, Ethier (1977) emphasizes that the effective rate of protection is useful for analyz-
ing distributional issues but not efficiency issues, and Anderson (1998) further argues that
it is closely linked with industry lobby power. Nevertheless, while domestic distributional
tensions, however manifested, may affect the degree of tariff cyclicality, our results suggest
terms of trade motivations drive the observed pro-cyclicality.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces our main empirical spec-
ifications. Section 3 describes our data and illustrates the variation in the data that drives
our empirical results. Section 4 presents and discusses our main empirical results. Section 5
investigates numerous robustness specifications. Section 6 explores the links between applied
tariff fluctuations and terms of trade motivations. The final section concludes.
2 Empirical models
Attempting to estimate the cyclicality of tariffs creates a number of issues regarding the
estimation technique. Our simplest estimation approach uses fixed effects OLS:
τi,j,t = θBCi,t−1 + xi,j,tβ + γt + γi,HS4 + εi,j,t (1)
where τi,j,t denotes the MFN applied tariff for product j in country i and year t at the
6-digit HS level. BCi,t−1 is a lagged measure of the business cycle in country i, so θ is
our primary parameter of interest. Given recent empirical and theoretical work in the
literature, we also include a vector of control variables xi,j,t. In our baseline analysis,
xi,j,t = [MPi,j, PTA_IMi,j,t, yi,t−1] where MPi,j is a measure of market power for importing
country i in the market for product j, PTA_IMi,j,t is the share of country i's imports of
product j sourced from preferential trade agreement (PTA) partners in year t, and yi,t−1 is
country i's lagged trend of log real GDP.7 Section 5.1 expands the vector of control variables.
As described in Section 3, our primary measure of the business cycle is detrended log
7Note that, by construction, BCi,t−1 + yi,t−1 equals country i's log real GDP in year t − 1. Thus, our
business cycle and trend variables can be viewed as a decomposition of log real GDP.
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real GDP obtained via the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. The HP filter decomposes a time
series of observed values for, say, log real GDP of country i (Yi,t) into a cyclical (BCi,t) and
trend (yi,t) component: Yi,t = BCi,t + yi,t. BCi,t = .01 means that log real GDP is 0.01
log points, or approximately 1%, above trend log real GDP. Given the central role of the
business cycle in our analysis but its infrequent use in the empirical trade literature, we
provide some intuition underlying its construction.
Consider two extreme methods for computing the trend yi,t, noting that the trend and
observed values Yi,t determine the cycle BCi,t via BCi,t = Yi,t−yi,t. First, one could choose yi,t
to simply minimize
∑
tBC
2
i,t =
∑
t (Yi,t − yi,t)2. The complete lack of structure this imposes
on the trend yi,t allows the trend to fluctuate in lock-step with Yi,t, thereby eliminating
any cycle: BCi,t = 0 for all t. Alternatively, one could impose a constant linear trend via
yi,t = δ0 +δ1t so that the trend grows by δ1 each period. In fact, the HP filter does something
in between. Letting ∆yi,t = yi,t − yi,t−1, the HP filter chooses the trend yi,t to minimize∑
t (Yi,t − yi,t)2 + λ (∆yi,t −∆yi,t−1). Thus, the HP filter allows temporal fluctuations in the
evolution of the trend but restricts the degree of such fluctuations through the penalty
parameter λ.8
Various recent papers have emphasized the relationship between market power and tariff
setting (see Bagwell and Staiger (2011), Bown and Crowley (2013b), Ludema and Mayda
(2013), Nicita et al. (2013) and Beshkar et al. (2015)). We follow Nicita et al. (2013) and
Beshkar et al. (2015) and measure the market power for importer i in product j, denoted
MPi,j, as ln
(
1/exi,j
)
where exi,j is the export supply elasticity of the rest of the world faced by
importer i in the market for product j. Like Nicita et al. (2013) and Beshkar et al. (2015),
we treat market power as potentially endogenous and deal with this possibility using the
instrumental variables approach of Nicita et al. (2013).
In addition to the role of market power, Ludema and Mayda (2013) also emphasize the
importance of controlling for the share of imports sourced from PTA partners. The impact
of this variable could arise, e.g., because of pressure from PTA partners to maintain the
preferential tariff access they receive relative to non-PTA partners (see Limão (2006), Limão
(2007) and Mai and Stoyanov (2015)). Any such mechanism should be stronger when the
share of imports sourced from PTA partners is higher. Thus, we include PTA_IMi,j,t as a
measure of the share of product j imports into importing country i sourced from importer
i's PTA partners in year t.
Finally, we also control for the lagged trend in log real GDP of country i, yi,t−1, as tariff
levels may be systematically related to development levels. Given the natural trend present
8There exist generally accepted values of λ that depend on the data frequency in the application at hand
(Ravn and Uhlig (2002)).
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in yi,t−1, controlling for yi,t−1 also helps control for the downward trend in tariffs over time.
Additionally, fixed effects are embedded within a composite error term ε˜i,j,t consisting
of an idiosyncratic component εi,j,t, year fixed effects γt and importer-sector fixed effects
γi,HS4. Year fixed effects γt help control for any time-specific factors that affect all countries
simultaneously and could be correlated with domestic business cycles. Importer-sector fixed
effects γi,HS4 define a sector as a 4-digit HS4 category. These control for any time-invariant
characteristics of sectors within countries, including importer-sector specific political econ-
omy influences that are time-invariant. These importer-sector fixed effects imply that our
results are driven by variation within these importer-sector clusters and not by cross-sector
variation within a country or by cross-country variation within (or across) sectors.
Notice that the key variable of interest, BCi,t−1, is measured at the country level which
is more aggregated than the country-product-year level at which the dependent variable
is measured. As recognized recently in the trade literature by, for example, Ludema and
Mayda (2013, p.1866), it is important that we cluster the standard errors at the country-
year level to match the aggregation level of our key regressor. In addition, despite our use of
country-HS4 fixed effects, there could be correlation between error terms at the country-HS4
level (either serial correlation for a given HS6 product or correlation between different HS6
products within an HS4 sector). Thus, we use two-way clustered standard errors (Cameron
et al. (2011)), clustering at the country-year and country-HS4 level.
Despite its appealing simplicity, OLS suffers an important drawback when analyzing tar-
iffs: it ignores the tariff non-negativity constraint. Previous work (e.g. Beshkar et al. (2015))
has addressed this issue using a Tobit model. However, as is well known, the Tobit model
yields inconsistent estimators in the presence of fixed effects (i.e. the incidental parame-
ters problem) and also when the idiosyncratic error term is heteroskedastic (e.g., Greene
(2004) and Cameron and Trivedi (2009, p.537)).9 Partly due to these issues, PPML (Poisson
pseudo-maximum likelihood) has become a popular method for dealing with the problem of
zeros in the gravity literature (see Silva and Tenreyro (2006)).10 We also implement PPML
estimation to deal with the tariff non-negativity constraint.
Although Poisson estimation is often used to model count or integer data, the gravity
literature has recently emphasized that PPML estimation works in more general settings
where the conditional mean of the dependent variable given the regressors is an exponential
9Not only is the assumption of homoskedasticity crucial for consistent estimation of the parameters in
the Tobit model, but so is normality (Cameron and Trivedi (2009, p.537)).
10Greene (2004, p.126) is one example emphasizing that the Poisson model is an exception to the rule
of thumb that maximum likelihood based models suffer from the incidental parameters problem. However,
theory showing that the Poisson model with multiple fixed effects does not suffer from the incidental pa-
rameters problem is still evolving. Fernández-Val and Weidner (2013) establishes the case with two fixed
effects.
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function (see, e.g., Silva and Tenreyro (2006)). In our context, this equates to
τi,j,t = exp (θBCi,t−1 + xi,j,tβ + γt + γi,HS4) + εi,j,t (2)
and the assumption that E(εi,j,t|BCi,t−1,xi,j,t, γt, γi,HS4) = 0 . This implies that E(τi,j,t|BCi,t−1,
xi,j,t, γt, γi,HS4) =exp(θBCi,t−1 + xi,j,tβ + γt + γi,HS4).
Unfortunately, two-way clustering procedures do not yet exist for PPML. We thus cluster
standard errors at the country level when estimating PPML specifications. This is more
conservative than our OLS approach because it allows an arbitrary structure of temporal
error correlation between any two HS6 products that a country imports rather than only
allowing such correlation between two products within a given HS4 sector. Thus, despite
our large sample size, the conservative standard errors imply the threshold for obtaining
statistical significance in the PPML specifications that follow is quite demanding. Indeed, the
statistical significance of our later results are substantially higher if we use less conservative
standard errors that cluster at a more disaggregated level.11
3 Data
3.1 Overview
Our baseline dataset has 2, 272, 198 country-product-year observations for 72 countries (see
Table A1 in the Appendix) at the disaggregated product (i.e. 6-digit HS6) level between
2000 and 2011. Table A2 in the Appendix summarizes our data and data sources.
Our primary data source for tariff data is the WTO's Integrated Data Base tariff database
via WITS (World Integrated Trade Solution). All bound tariff data come from here. For a
small number of country-year combinations where the WTO data were missing, we obtain
applied tariffs from the UNCTAD TRAINS database using WITS.12 Given our focus on
changes in tariffs over time for a given country, we restrict our sample to countries for which
we are missing no more than two years of tariff data during the pre-Great Recession years
of 2000-2009.13
11Specifically, the BCi,t−1 coefficients in column (6) of Panel B in Table 2 and column (0) of Panel A in
Table 4 are both statistically significant at the p < .001 level when clustering at the country-HS section level
(there are 21 HS sections).
12For countries with WTO tariff data for a majority of our sample years, we supplement with any available
TRAINS data.
13For countries that joined the WTO prior to our sample, which begins in 2000, this equates to 8 of the
10 years for 2000-2009. For countries that joined the WTO in or after the first year in our sample, we apply
the same rule of allowing only 2 years of missing data for those years in which they were members of the
WTO. Later, as a robustness exercise, we exclude all countries that joined the WTO after its creation in
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Our business cycle and trend GDP variables require collection of GDP data. For most
countries, we obtain this GDP data from the World Bank's World Development Indicators,
which stretches back to 1960 for many countries.14,15 Like Rose (2013), our baseline results
measure the business cycle by estimating the cyclical component of log real GDP using the
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter (Hodrick and Prescott (1997); also see discussion in Section 2).
The HP filter has been used to measure the business cycle in a variety of fields ranging from
trade (e.g. Rose (2013)) to labor (Chang and Kim (2007)) and environmental economics
(Heutel (2012) and Doda (2014)). Moreover, as stated by Ravn and Uhlig (2002, p.371), ...
it has withstood the test of time and the fire of discussion remarkably well and ... although
elegant new bandpass filters are being developed (Baxter and King (1999), Christiano and
Fitzgerald (2003)), it is likely that the HP filter will remain one of the standard methods for
detrending. In the Appendix (Table A5), we analyze robustness of our baseline results to
using the Baxter-King and Christiano-Fitzgerald filters.16
We set 2000-2011 as our baseline years for three reasons. First, the HP filter suffers from
a well known endpoint problem, struggling to distinguish between trend and realized values
at the sample endpoints. Thus, we disregard the last three years of the HP filter decompo-
sition 2011-2013. Second, the Uruguay Round, concluded in 1994, led to substantial tariff
binding concessions. Thus, we focus on the post-1994 WTO years to avoid an institutional
discontinuity. Third, in analyzing the cyclicality of tariffs, it is critical that we avoid reaching
conclusions based on the institutional necessity of reducing MFN tariffs to meet these new
tariff binding obligations. Thus, we exclude the years during which countries were allowed
to gradually phase in tariff reductions to meet their tariff binding obligations. Specifically,
the phase-in period was 5 years for industrial products in all countries, 6 years for agricul-
tural products in developed countries, and 10 years for agricultural products in developing
countries (Hoda (2001, p.66)). Hence, we exclude the years 1995-1999 in their entirety and
agricultural products for the additional relevant years. As a robustness exercise, we later
extend the sample back to 1989 despite these issues.
We also account for two other institutional features dictating the timing of applied tariff
1995. If we instead restrict our sample to countries for which we are missing no more than two years of tariff
data during the entire sample period (2000-2011), this eliminates only Ghana from our sample and does not
change our results in any meaningful way.
14For EU real GDP, we aggregate real GDP for the 15 individual EU countries as of 1999. That is, for
data purposes, we treat EU membership as time-invariant and dictated by 1999 membership.
15WDI data for Qatar starts in 1994, so we use UN data prior to 1994.
16Two primary reasons motivate our investigation of robustness to alternative filters. First, by their
nature, filters provide statistical procedures to decompose a time series into cyclical and trend components
which are not tied to the fundamental data generating process of the underlying time series. Second, unlike
the HP filter, the Christiano-Fitzgerald filter is designed to deal with an underlying time series that is a
random walk or random walk with drift.
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reductions. Countries joining the WTO after 1995 submitted detailed product-by-product
schedules for tariff reductions. We obtain the tariff binding and phase-in schedules of all new
WTO members and exclude any product-year observations during their phase-in periods.
Finally, many countries joined the Information Technology Act (ITA) and have thereby
committed to zero tariff bindings on hundreds of information technology products. Again,
we collect each country's ITA schedule and exclude any country-product observations during
the respective phase-in period.17
Until recently, obtaining disaggregated measures of market power at the product level
for a large cross-section of countries was not possible. However, Nicita et al. (2013) have
estimated export supply elasticities from the view of the importer for over 100 countries
and thousands of products at the HS6 level. They use these to construct the market power
variable MPi,j = ln
(
1
exi,j
)
described in the previous section. Moreover, they also compute
import demand elasticities as well as export supply elasticities from the view of the exporter
and use world averages of these to instrument for market power. We follow their approach
as Peri da Silva kindly provided us with these elasticity data. Additionally, Section 6 utilizes
importer-product specific measures of import demand elasticities, emi,j, from Kee et al. (2008).
In order to compute PTA_IMi,j,t, the share of country i's imports in product j in year t
that are sourced from PTA partners, we need country i's PTA partners in each year and trade
data that splits country i's product-level imports among source countries. For the former,
we use the NSF-Kellogg Institute Data Base on Economic Integration Agreements, originally
created by Scott Baier and Jeffrey Bergstrand, to extract the countries that have an FTA or
a CU in each year of our sample.18 While Ludema and Mayda (2013) do not treat their PTA
import share variable as endogenous, we are concerned that temporal changes in applied
tariffs could affect the share of imports coming from PTA partners given that an applied
tariff represents a preferential margin that PTA partners enjoy over non-PTA members. To
minimize any such endogeneity problem, we use time-invariant trade shares from a year
prior to the importing country appearing in our sample when computing PTA_IMi,j,t.
Specifically, let PTAi,k,t be a binary variable that indicates whether countries i and k have
an FTA or a CU in year t, and let IMi,j,k be country i's imports of product j from country
k in some year prior to country i appearing in our sample. Then,
PTA_IMi,j,t =
∑
k 6=i
IMi,j,k∑
k IMi,j,k
PTAi,k,t. (3)
17ITA schedules were obtained from http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/inftec_e/itscheds_e.htm.
18The database itself is only updated through 2005, but it also provides a list of agreements for 2006-2012
that have not yet been entered into the database. We add these agreements into the database.
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With some exceptions, we use 1999 trade data for the trade flows IMi,j,k and we obtain these
trade flows from COMTRADE using the WITS database.19
In addition to the variables described above, we augment the dataset with additional
control variables for the robustness analysis in Section 5.1 and our investigation of a terms
of trade explanation in Section 6. First, we add whether country i imposes a temporary
trade barrier (TTB) on product j in year t using data on TTBs from the World Bank's
Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown (2010)). Second, we consider whether product
j is an intermediate good or not based on the UN Broad Economic Categories classification
system.20 Third, we include a proxy for the global business cycle from the perspective of
the importer. To calculate this proxy, let IMi,k be country i's imports from country k in
the year underlying IMi,j,k in (3). Then, we define the trade weighted global business cycle
from the perspective of the importing country i as
GBCi,t−1 =
∑
k 6=i
IMi,k∑
k IMi,k
BCk,t−1
where k indexes all countries and not only those in our sample. Finally, we also add variables
related to imports. Specifically, we utilize (i) country i's lagged log real imports of product j,
IMi,j,t−1, (ii) country i's lagged share of product j world imports, IM sharei,j,t−1, and (iii) country
i's lagged detrended (i.e. first differenced) log real imports of product j, ∆IMi,j,t−1, and its
standard deviation, sd∆IMi,j,t−1.
As described above, we exclude observations where a country is phasing in its MFN tariff
to meet its new tariff binding obligation. We also eliminate observations for a country prior
to its joining the WTO because then it was not constrained by any tariff bindings (see Table
A1 for WTO membership details). We further exclude outlier observations related to changes
in applied tariffs: specifically, we exclude observations if the magnitude of the applied tariff
change lies in the top 1% of applied tariff increases or the top 1% of applied tariff decreases.
After these exclusions, we have the 2, 272, 198 observations noted earlier.
Table A3 presents summary statistics for the overall sample and subsamples by develop-
ment level.21 A few points stand out. Overall, countries have significant flexibility to change
their applied tariffs up and down over time. For the overall sample, the mean tariff binding is
22.44% while the mean applied tariff is 7.86%. These numbers rise to 29.49% and 10.02% for
19Lack of trade data availability causes us to use trade data from 2000 for Qatar and Bahrain. Neverthe-
less, there is no tariff data for Qatar in 2000.
20We use a concordance to map the raw data into HS6 products (see Table A2 in the Appendix).
21We use the World Bank's historical classification (see notes to Table A1 and footnote 43) to classify
a country as developed (high-income per the World Bank) or developing (not high-income per the World
Bank).
12
developing countries but fall substantially to 8.94% and 3.37% for developed countries. Thus,
as one would expect, the implied flexibility is significantly higher for developing countries.
Regarding the covariates, some notable differences also emerge between developing and
developed countries. On average, countries are 0.1% below trend GDP over our sample
with a standard deviation of 2.0% points. But, on average, the business cycle is weaker in
developing countries (0.1% below trend versus 0.05% below trend). Perhaps surprisingly,
the variation in the business cycle is similar between developing and developed countries
(standard deviation is 2.0% for developing, 1.9% for developed). Not surprisingly, the trend
of log real GDP and the mean market power are significantly greater in developed countries.22
3.2 Preliminary evidence of pro-cyclical applied tariffs
Before presenting the results of the main empirical analysis, we first illustrate the variation
in the data that drives our regression results.
To analyze the cyclicality of applied tariffs, we need to ensure that applied tariffs indeed
vary over time and that they both increase and decrease.23 Panel A of Table 1 summarizes
the frequency of tariff changes in our sample. For 11.29% of observations, the applied tariff
changed relative to the prior year in our sample, and this is significantly higher in developing
than developed countries (13.43% vs. 6.87%). While applied tariff decreases are far more
common than applied tariff increases, Panel B shows that applied tariff increases are non-
trivial events. When applied tariffs change, Panel B shows that 20.44% of such observations
are applied tariff increases. While Panel A shows the average direction of an applied tariff
change is negative, unsurprisingly given the relative frequency of applied tariff decreases,
Panel B shows the average size of applied tariff increases and decreases is around 3.5-4.5%
points both for the overall sample and for the subsample of developing countries.
[Table 1 about here.]
Figure 1 illustrates the pattern of applied tariff changes over time. Panel A shows a
noticeable downward trend in the frequency of applied tariff decreases over time with this
number falling from around 19% of all observations in the early 2000s to around 5% for
2008-2011. While applied tariff increases accounted for 4.5-5% of observations in the early
2000s, they have remained a steady share of 1-1.5% of observations for 2008-2011. Thus,
22As the trend variable is the log of trend real GDP, the difference is substantial. While the inverse export
supply elasticity 1exi,j
ranges from close to 0 to almost 90, 000, MPi,j = ln
(
1
exi,j
)
ranges from −11.40 to 21.72
with higher numbers indicating stronger market power.
23Using a sample of 10 Latin American countries between 1990 and 2001, Estevadeordal et al. (2008) is
one of the few papers that document product level applied tariffs both rising and falling over time.
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throughout the sample period, applied tariff increases represent a non-negligible proportion
of applied tariff changes.24
[Figure 1 about here.]
Panel B of Figure 1 provides one aggregate view of applied tariff cyclicality. Here we plot
the global share of applied tariff changes that are applied tariff increases against a measure of
the lagged global business cycle that merely averages BCi,t−1 across all observations in a given
year of our sample. Two noteworthy points emerge. First, the dramatic drop in the average
business cycle across countries in 2010 and 2011 clearly indicates that the observations for
2010 and 2011 in our sample correspond to the Great Recession.25 Second, evidence at this
level of aggregation does not suggest that the direction of tariff changes are systematically
related to the average business cycle across countries.26,27
Since aggregation at the national level can conceal much of the product-level variation
observed in the data, the empirical analysis in Section 4 focuses on the cyclicality of applied
tariffs at the product level. If applied tariffs exhibit cyclicality, there should be products
where countries move the applied tariff up and down over the business cycle (in contrast
to, for example, permanently raising applied tariffs on some products during booms and
permanently lowering applied tariffs on other products during recessions). Panel C of Table
1 illustrates the type of tariff changes that occur over the duration of our sample within
country-product clusters. Overall, 58.38% of country-products experience no change in the
applied tariff over our sample period with changes much more common in developing than
developed countries. A further 26.35% of country-products only experience a decrease in the
applied tariff over the sample period, significantly larger than the share of country-products
that only experience an applied tariff increase over the sample period. Perhaps surprisingly,
11.24% of country-products experience both an applied tariff increase and an applied tariff
24With roughly 5000 HS6 products, this amounts to an average of around 75 products for which the
applied tariff increases per country-year. Further, given the emphasis placed on temporary trade barriers
in the recent literature, it is worthwhile noting that applied tariff increases are more common than the
imposition of new TTBs even among many of the most prolific users of TTBs.
25Since our business cycle measure is BCi,t−1, the 2010 and 2011 tariff observations relate to 2009 and
2010 GDP data.
26This is consistent with Rose (2013) who analyzes aggregate country-level tariffs and finds that they are
acyclical.
27One might wonder whether the average business cycle for the 2000-2011 period is typical relative to
earlier decades. Relative to the variation in a given decade (back to the 1960s), the average business cycle
is always very close to zero. However, the volatility in the average business cycle in the 2000-2011 period
is about 30-40% lower than any prior decade. Thus, events particular to the 2000-2011 period (e.g. the
recovery from the Asian Financial crisis) do not appear to make the period unusual. Moreover, the extent
to which the results are relevant to other periods appears to depend on the importance of business cycle
volatility on tariff setting in a structural model.
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decrease over our sample period, and this share is much greater in developing relative to
developed countries (14.01% vs. 5.24%). Thus, there is a significant number of products
where countries move the applied tariff up and down over the sample period.28
Evidence of tariff cyclicality requires a comparison of product-level tariffs at different
points of the business cycle for a given country, that is, a comparison of tariffs within a
country-product cluster. The empirical analysis throughout the paper implements this idea.
Figure 2 provides a motivating illustration by plotting the difference between the ap-
plied tariff for a country-product-year (τi,j,t) and the mean applied tariff for this country-
product (τ˜i,j ≡ 1T
∑2011
t=2000 τi,j,t) against the difference between the lagged business cycle
measure for the country (BCi,t−1) and the mean business cycle for the country (B˜Ci ≡
1
T
∑2011
t=2000BCi,t−1); the figure also shows the OLS regression line of τi,j,t − τ˜i,j on BCi,t−1 −
B˜Ci. In panels A-C of Figure 2, the observations are restricted to (i) country-product clus-
ters where the applied tariff moves both up and down over the sample period and (ii) the
years within these country-product clusters where the applied tariff changed from the pre-
vious year. The figure thus shows how temporal fluctuations in country i's tariff on a given
product j correlate with temporal fluctuations in country i's business cycle. The slope of
the OLS regression line provides some preliminary evidence suggesting that applied tariffs
could indeed be pro-cyclical when pooling all countries and, in particular, for the subsample
of developing countries (panel B). It also suggests that tariff cyclicality may differ between
developing and developed countries.
Panels D-E of Figure 2 perform a similar exercise to motivate the analysis in Section
6 that explores whether terms of trade motivations could drive the pro-cyclicality in de-
veloping countries. To the extent that terms of trade motivations provide an explanation,
pro-cyclicality should be pronounced not merely for country-product pairs that have high
market power on average but for those years where country-product market power is un-
usually high or low. Panels D and E both restrict the developing country observations from
panel B by only considering country-product pairs with high time-invariant market power.29
But, panel D focuses on years where the country-product pair has relatively high or low
market power as proxied by unusual import fluctuations.30 Conversely, panel E focuses on
years where the country-product pair has a typical level of import fluctuations and hence
typical market power. The noticeably steeper slope in panel D relative to panel E suggests
28For country-product pairs where the applied tariff moves up and down over the sample period, the mean
number of tariff changes is 3.53.
29Specifically, high market power observations are country-product pairs above the 66th percentile of the
market power distribution in our sample.
30Specifically, unusual import fluctuations means a country-product-year where the lagged change in
imports relative to the country-product mean, i.e. ∆IMi,j,t−1 − 1T
∑2011
t=2000 ∆IMi,j,t−1, lies in the extreme
terciles of the sample distribution.
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the pro-cyclicality in developing countries could be related to situations where developing
countries are experiencing unusual fluctuations in market power.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Ultimately, Figure 2 illustrates the variation in data that motivate the empirical analysis
in Sections 4 and 6.31
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Pro-cyclical applied tariffs
Panel A of Table 2 presents the results from OLS estimation of equation (1). Column
(1) includes only the business cycle (BCi,t−1) and excludes fixed effects. Columns (2) and
(3), respectively, add country-HS4 and year fixed effects. Columns (4), (5) and (6) add
the lagged trend of log real GDP (yi,t−1), market power (MPi,j), and PTA import share
(PTA_IMi,j,t) as covariates. Column (7) instruments for market power. For comparison,
column (8) performs OLS using the observations from column (7).32
[Table 2 about here.]
The pro-cyclicality of tariffs emerges in columns (4)-(6) once the lagged trend of log
real GDP is included; the point estimate is positive, statistically significant at the 10%
level, and very stable across these specifications. Prior literature has treated market power
as endogenous. However, any such endogeneity is unlikely to cause problems in terms of
estimating the cyclicality of tariffs because columns (5) and (6) indicate that market power is
essentially uncorrelated with the business cycle. Nevertheless, we use instrumental variables
(IV) estimation in column (7).33
Following Nicita et al. (2013) and similar to Beshkar et al. (2015), we instrument for a
country's product-level market power using the average product-level import demand elastic-
ity in the rest of the world and the product-level global average export supply elasticity from
31The magnitude of pro-cyclicality suggested by Figure 2 is non-trivial. Based on the procedure used to
address economic significance in later sections, the slope point estimate for Panel A suggests that the average
business cycle fluctuation between the peak of the boom and the trough of the recession represents about
60% of the average applied tariff fluctuation.
32Column (2) has 81 fewer observations than column (1) because of country-HS4 pairs with only one
observation over the sample period. An example of these rare occurrences is a country who joined the WTO
shortly prior to years subject to major changes in the HS tariff classification (e.g. 2002). Columns (7)-(8)
have fewer observations than columns (2)-(6) because of data limitations for the import demand elasticity
instrument.
33OLS estimation performed using reghdfe (Correia (2014)) and IV estimation performed using xtivreg2
(Schaffer (2015)) in STATA.
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the view of the exporter. These instruments appear to do reasonably well based on various
specification tests. Based on the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic, we easily reject the null
that the effect of market power is unidentified (p = .011). However, the Kleibergen-Paap
rk Wald F -statistic of 4.667 suggests the instruments are somewhat weak. Nevertheless,
we cannot reject the null that the instruments are exogenous based on Hansen's J test
of over identification (p = .088). Finally, the endogeneity test (based on comparing two
Sargan-Hansen statistics) cannot reject the null that market power variable itself is actually
exogenous (p = .981). Thus, as market power is essentially uncorrelated with our regressor
of interest and we cannot reject the null that it is indeed exogenous, we henceforth treat
market power as exogenous on efficiency grounds.34 In any case, IV estimation preserves the
sign and also the economic and statistical significance of the coefficients.
To address the economic magnitude of applied tariff cyclicality, note that the average
gap between a country's maximum and minimum value of BCi,t−1 over our sample period
is 0.061 and this gap rises to 0.098 for a country one standard deviation above the mean.
These numbers provide measures of the magnitude of business cycle fluctuations and one
could, intuitively, think of 0.061 as a proxy for the average fluctuation between the peak of
the boom and the trough of the recession. The BCi,t−1 point estimate of 7.49 in column
(6) then implies that the fluctuation in applied tariffs between the peak of the boom and
the trough of the recession is 0.46% points and represents 12.20% of the average magnitude
of applied tariff changes.35 For a country with business cycle fluctuations one standard
deviation above the mean, this share becomes 19.59% of the average magnitude of applied
tariff changes. From these perspectives, business cycle fluctuations explain a non-trivial, but
not overwhelming, portion of temporal applied tariff fluctuations. Thus, the pro-cyclicality
evident in Table 2 appears both statistically and economically significant.
Turning to the other covariates, the negative coefficient on the lagged trend of log real
GDP in columns (6)-(8) shows the expected downward trend in tariffs over time as trend log
real GDP rises. Moreover, while the coefficient for the share of imports from PTA partners
is positive as expected given the motivation in Section 2, it is not statistically significant.
While the literature emphasizes the importance of market power in tariff setting (e.g.,
Bagwell and Staiger (2011), Ludema and Mayda (2013), Nicita et al. (2013)), the statistically
insignificant market power coefficients in Table 2 are not necessarily inconsistent with this
emphasis. First, while Beshkar et al. (2015) highlight the role of market power, they find
that its relationship with MFN tariffs is non-monotonic and depends on the degree of market
34Note that omitting an endogenous regressor that is uncorrelated with the key regressor of interest does
not bias the estimate of the key regressor.
35The average magnitude of applied tariff changes is 3.76% points.
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power. Second, Broda et al. (2008) find that market power is not a significant determinant
of applied tariffs in the United States. Third, as already discussed, developed countries
have very low tariff bindings on average and, hence, little latitude for adjusting tariffs in
response to business cycles or market power fluctuations. Since Table 2 pools developed
and developing countries as well as high and low market power products, it is not surprising
that the relationship between market power and applied tariffs is statistically insignificant.
Finally, the results use country-HS4 fixed effects and a measure of market power, MPi,j,
that is country-product specific but time-invariant. The results thus say that differences
in a country's market power across HS6 products within a HS4 sector do not help explain
why a country's tariffs for HS6 products differ from the country's average tariff across time
and products within the HS4 sector. This differs from prior work (e.g. Bagwell and Staiger
(2011), Ludema and Mayda (2013), Beshkar et al. (2015)) that relies on differences in market
power across HS6 products within broader two-digit HS2 industries.
As discussed in Section 2, OLS assumes that the dependent variable can take positive
and negative values, ignoring the non-negativity constraint imposed on tariffs. Panel B of
Table 2 directly addresses this concern via PPML estimation (see estimating equation (2)),
with each column having the same interpretation as the analogous column of Panel A.36,37
Importantly, Panel B shows that the pro-cyclicality of applied tariffs observed under OLS
is not driven by OLS ignoring the non-negativity constraint on tariffs. Specifically, columns
(3)-(6) show that PPML estimation preserves applied tariff pro-cyclicality.
PPML and OLS estimation imply a similar magnitude of tariff pro-cyclicality. The
business cycle point estimate of 0.875 in column (6) says that the average business cycle
fluctuation of 0.061 is associated with a 5.5% change in the applied MFN tariff.38 Thus, at
the mean tariff of 7.86% points, this average business cycle fluctuation would be associated
with a tariff change of 0.43% points, which is slightly lower than the OLS estimate of 0.46%
points. The more conservative PPML estimates suggest that the non-negativity constraint
on applied tariffs may be empirically important.
For other covariates, PPML and OLS tell a similar story. Again, temporal fluctuations
in tariffs are not systematically related to market power or the share of imports sourced
from PTA partners. Interestingly, lagged trend log real GDP is still negatively correlated
with tariffs but no longer statistically significant, although this may arise from the more
36Two issues explain the smaller number of observations in column (2) relative to column (1). First, there
is the issue of 81 fewer observations as in Panel A. Second, PPML drops country-HS4 clusters where the
applied tariff is always zero. Indeed, as is common with PPML estimation, the estimation sample size is
then about 20% smaller than OLS.
37The reported R2 for PPML specifications is McFadden's pseudo-R2. PPML estimation performed using
xtpqml (Simcoe (2007)) in STATA.
38Specifically, .054 = exp (.875× .06)− 1.
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conservative PPML standard errors (see discussion in Section 2). Given that PPML takes
into account the non-negativity tariff constraint, uses more conservative clustering, and yields
similar results to OLS, we henceforth focus our discussion on PPML specifications.39
Table 3 analyzes the robustness of our pro-cyclical tariff result by varying the sample. For
presentation, column (0) reports the baseline results from column (6) of Table 2. Column
(1) excludes agricultural goods. To address the issue that some HS6 codes are actually an
average of more disaggregated country-specific HS8 or HS10 tariff lines, column (2) excludes
country-HS6 products that have more than one tariff line within the HS6 code. Columns (3)
and (4) each exclude some countries in the sample: column (3) excludes countries that joined
the WTO after 1995 to ensure that the results are not driven by new WTO members, and
column (4) excludes China and the EU.40 Our pro-cyclical tariff result is robust to these four
exclusions. Of particular note is column (3): excluding new WTO members substantially
increases the estimated degree of tariff cyclicality. Intuitively, this is perhaps not surprising
because, on average, new WTO members have lower tariff bindings than original WTO
members (14.37% vs. 23.64%), implying much lower flexibility to vary their applied tariffs.
[Table 3 about here.]
To address the issue of business cycle outliers, column (5) excludes observations that lie in
the top or bottom 1% of our sample distribution for BCi,t−1. Importantly, the point estimate
on our business cycle variable is very stable relative to the baseline specification that does not
exclude business cycle outliers. Thus, our pro-cyclical tariff result is not driven by the most
extreme business cycle fluctuations. However, our estimates are less precise when excluding
the business cycle outliers and fail statistical significance at the 10% level.41 We return to
this issue when investigating a terms of trade explanation for applied tariff pro-cyclicality in
Section 6.
Column (6) excludes two groups of observations: (i) observations where the applied tariff
exceeds the tariff binding and subsequent observations where the applied tariff is brought
back below the tariff binding and (ii) observations with no tariff binding, a zero tariff binding,
or a time varying tariff binding.42 The results are robust to these exclusions.
39OLS analogs of remaining tables in the main text can be found in Table A4 in the Appendix and always
confirm the important PPML results.
40We exclude the EU because EU applied tariffs are decided at the regional level while economic growth is
arguably impacted more by country-level variables. We exclude China to ensure that results are not driven
solely by its rapid economic growth.
41No particular country or year dominates the business cycle outliers.
42We exclude these because we are not interested in explaining the rare occurrences related to changes in
tariff bindings, countries violating WTO rules by ignoring their tariff bindings, or countries reducing applied
tariffs to rectify such violations. Exclusion of unbound tariff lines is partly motivated by recent empirical and
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To address any possible structural changes in policies resulting from the Great Recession,
column (7) excludes the Great Recession years (tariff observations in 2010 and 2011 and thus
GDP observations for 2009 and 2010). The business cycle point estimate is substantially
higher than the baseline sample that includes the Great Recession years which suggests the
Great Recession years actually mitigated the extent of applied tariff pro-cyclicality.
While the sample period selection reflects our attempt to avoid confounding Uruguay
Round phase-in periods with business cycle fluctuations, one might nevertheless wonder
whether our results hold when extending the sample period backward. This question may
be of particular relevance given that our baseline estimates use a relatively short time period
to identify the impact of business cycles on tariff fluctuations within a country-HS4 cluster
of observations. We extend our sample backward in two steps.
First, the sample in column (8) begins in 1995 so that the sample period now reflects the
entire post-Uruguay Round period. However, given our concerns over confounding phase-in
tariff reductions with business cycle-driven fluctuations during this period, we only add ob-
servations that, to the extent such inference is possible, appear very unlikely to be associated
with phase-in of Uruguay Round negotiations. Specifically, relative to our baseline sample
in column (0) and using the same set of sample countries, we add back observations for
country-HS6 pairs that always exhibit (weakly) positive binding overhang during phase-in
years. Doing so increases the sample size by 26.9%. While the business cycle point estimate
is smaller, statistical significance remains at the 10% level and actually becomes slightly
more precise (p = .056 versus p = .062).
Second, column (9) stretches our sample back to 1989 which is as far back as we can push
our product-level sample using the Harmonized System (HS) of tariff classification. Relative
to column (8) and again using the same set of sample countries, we add country-product
observations for the period 1989-1994. Relative to the baseline sample in column (0), the
sample size is 49.3% larger. Moreover, the business cycle point estimate is now larger and
statistically significant at the 5% level (p = .034). Ultimately, despite our concerns about
extending the sample back to earlier years, the results are robust to this exercise and, at
least to some extent, increase the precision of the business cycle estimate.
4.2 Cyclicality and level of development
As discussed in Section 3.1, developing countries enjoy significantly higher tariff bindings
and binding overhang than developed countries. Further, the fact that developing countries
are much more likely than developed countries to move the applied tariff on a given product
theoretical work including Handley and Limão (2012), Groppo and Piermartini (2014) and Handley (2014).
Furthermore, products with a zero tariff binding have no possibility of tariff fluctuation.
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up and down over time suggests that they exploit the greater applied tariff flexibility implied
by the higher bindings. We therefore investigate whether the cyclicality of applied tariffs
depends on the level of development. We classify a country as either developed or developing
based on historical categorizations by the World Bank (see Table A1).43
Table 4 presents the results and suggests that the cyclicality discussed in Section 4.1 is
driven by developing countries. Column (0) of Panels A and B split the baseline sample
of Table 2 into developing country (Panel A) and developed country (Panel B) subsamples.
Relative to the pooled baseline results, the business cycle point estimate rises somewhat
for developing countries and remains statistically significant at the 10% level (p = .051).
Conversely, the business cycle point estimate for developed countries is small in economic
magnitude and very far from conventional levels of statistical significance. That is, applied
tariffs appear acyclical in developed countries while the tariff behavior of developing countries
drives the pro-cyclical tariff result reported in Table 2.
[Table 4 about here.]
As one may expect, the economic magnitude of tariff pro-cyclicality in the developing
country subsample exceeds that in the pooled sample. The business cycle point estimate of
0.933 in column (0) of Panel A says that the average business cycle fluctuation in developing
countries of 0.061 is associated with a 5.8% rise in the applied MFN tariff. Thus, at the mean
tariff for developing countries of 11.16% points, this average business cycle fluctuation would
be associated with a tariff increase of 0.65% points, which is 15.35% of the average applied
tariff change in developing countries. Relative to the share of the average applied tariff
change in the pooled sample explained by the business cycle, this 15.35% share represents a
33.3% increase in the economic magnitude of the business cycle impact.
With one exception, the remaining coefficient estimates are similar to the baseline results
for the pooled sample. Specifically, the point estimate for the PTA import share is positive
and statistically significant in developed countries: applied tariffs in developed countries are
higher on products where a larger share of imports are sourced from PTA partners. Ear-
lier literature has found similar effects for the US (Limão (2006)) and Canada (Mai and
Stoyanov (2015)). Our results show that this phenomenon is a broad pattern across de-
veloped countries but does not characterize developing country applied tariffs. Intuitively,
high MFN tariffs avoid erosion of tariff preferences for PTA partners. But, given that de-
veloping country markets generally account for a small share of developed country exports,
43 For 5 out of 72 countries in our sample, their development status switches between developed and
developing during the sample period. To maximize the time dimension within country-sector clusters, we
treat a country as developed (developing) for the entire sample when they appear as developed for more
than 50% (less than or equal to 50%) of years in the sample. Panel A of Table A5 in the appendix shows
that the baseline results are robust to the alternative time-varying definition of development status.
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developed countries may be unconcerned about protecting their PTA tariff preferences in
developing country markets. Furthermore, developed countries often obtain non-tariff and
even non-trade concessions from developing countries (Limão (2007)). Thus, having ex-
tracted non-tariff and/or non-trade concessions, a developed country may be less concerned
about maintaining tariff preferences in a small market. Hence, the share of a developing
country's imports from its PTA partners may be uncorrelated with MFN tariff rates that
maintain these preferences.
Columns (1)-(9) of Table 4 present the same alternative sample robustness checks as
Table 3. As in the pooled sample, the business cycle point estimate for developing countries
fails statistical significance at the 10% level when excluding the business cycle outliers (col-
umn (5)). Nevertheless, again, the point estimate actually increases somewhat relative to
the baseline pooled estimate and so the magnitude of pro-cyclicality is not driven by these
outliers. Otherwise, the remaining columns in Table 4 confirm the baseline developing coun-
try results from column (0). In particular, despite our concerns about extending the sample
backward, column (9) shows that the business cycle point estimate becomes statistically
significant at the 1% level when extending the sample back to 1989.
5 Extensions
5.1 Sensitivity analysis
We now include additional control variables to further investigate the robustness of our
results. Specifically, we consider whether our results are robust to controlling for import
surges, the global business cycle, whether a good is an intermediate good, and whether a
good is subject to a temporary trade barrier. In the Appendix (Table A5), we use alternative
filtering techniques to measure the business cycle.44 Table 5 presents the results but, for
brevity, only displays the business cycle variable and the added control variable(s). The
results indicate that the pro-cyclicality of applied tariffs for developing countries is robust.45
[Table 5 about here.]
44We implement the Baxter-King filter and the Christiano-Fitzgerald filter. For the latter, we use a third
order symmetric moving average (which is the STATA default for the Baxter-King filter) to ensure it is
robust to second order trends.
45Columns (2) and (4) for developed and developing countries, respectively, have the same number of
observations as the baseline sample in Table 4. Column (3) has fewer observations because we don't have an
intermediate goods classification for all HS6 codes in our sample (e.g. some HS6 codes have a BEC code of
7 which is not elsewhere specified). Column (1) has fewer observations because we don't have trade data
for all observations in our sample.
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Import surges. Recently, the empirical literature has documented the importance of
import surges, and their volatility, as a determinant of tariff setting (e.g. Bown and Crowley
(2013b)). It is a priori plausible that our pro-cyclical applied tariff results could be driven by
pro-cyclical import surges (which would then be correlated with our business cycle variable).
Columns (1) and (5) of Table 5 control for import surges, ∆IMi,j,t−1, and their volatility,
sd∆IMi,j,t−1 (see Section 3.1) and shows that the results from Tables 2-4 persist.46
Global business cycle. Columns (2) and (6) control for a measure of the global business
cycle from the perspective of the importer, GBCi,t−1, as described in Section 3.1. The
point estimates for the main business cycle variable BCi,t−1 change only slightly, and the
sign and statistical significance remain as in Tables 2-4. The estimated coefficient on the
global business cycle variable is not statistically significant for developing countries, but the
relationship is positive and statistically significant for developed countries. This provides
some evidence suggesting that a developed country raises (lowers) tariffs on its trading
partners when its major trading partners are experiencing a boom (recession).47
Intermediate goods. Columns (3) and (7) investigate whether the degree of cyclicality
depends on whether a good is an intermediate good.48 We include an indicator variable
Intermedj for whether product j is an intermediate good (according to the UN's Broad
Economic Categories classification system) and the interaction term Intermedj × BCi,t−1.
Not surprisingly given the presumed preference of final-good producers for low tariffs on
intermediate inputs, the point estimates for Intermedj are statistically significant for devel-
oping and developed countries showing that countries tend to have lower applied tariffs on
intermediate goods. The point estimate of cyclicality for non-intermediate goods in devel-
oping countries (i.e. BCi,t−1) is little changed from the baseline results and the interaction
term is far from statistically significant at conventional levels which suggests the degree of
cyclicality does not depend on whether a good is an intermediate good or not. The results
for developed countries are consistent with the baseline results that tariffs are acyclical.
Temporary Trade Barriers (TTBs). Columns (4) and (8) investigate how our results
are affected by recognizing that countries can also impose protection via TTBs. We include
an indicator TTBi,j,t for whether country i imposes a TTB on product j in year t and also the
interaction term TTBi,j,t × BCi,t−1. In this specification, BCi,t−1 represents the cyclicality
when a product is not subject to a TTB. The economic and statistical significance of the
46Given our empirical specification, one may think we should control for the level of log real imports rather
than the change in log real imports. But, given the level of log real imports is trending upward over our
sample, one can interpret the change in log real imports as a simple measure of detrended log real imports.
47This is counter to the expected results based on the model developed in Bagwell and Staiger (2003)
whereby countries keep tariffs lower during booms because they have more to lose if their trade partners
retaliate.
48Goods that are not intermediate are either primary or final goods.
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cyclicality estimate are unaffected by the inclusion of the TTB variables. Given that only
about 1% of observations are subject to TTBs (see Table A3), it is unsurprising that the
developing country BCi,t−1 coefficient estimates are virtually unchanged from the baseline
results. While the interaction term fails statistical significance at conventional levels, it is
borderline for developing countries (p = .105). With this in mind, it is noteworthy that the
point estimate for cyclicality on products that are subject to TTBs (i.e. BCi,t−1 +TTBi,j,t×
BCi,t−1) is close to zero and we cannot reject that it is different from zero at the 10% level
of significance. This suggests that tariffs for products subject to TTBs may be acyclical
in developing countries. Moreover, the point estimate for TTBi,j,t indicates that products
under TTB protection also have higher applied tariffs. Thus, countries appear to impose
TTBs on products that have high applied tariffs and, in this sense, applied tariffs and TTBs
could be viewed as complements.
5.2 Cyclicality and aggregate applied tariffs
A key difference with our analysis compared to Rose (2013) is our use of highly disaggregated
product-level tariff data (and covariates) compared to Rose's aggregate country-level tariff
data (and covariates). This difference could potentially help explain why we find pro-cyclical
tariffs yet Rose (2013) finds acyclical tariffs. In order to investigate this possibility, we now
estimate the relationship between business cycles and aggregate country-level tariffs.
The results, presented in Table 6, indicate that aggregation can obscure the influence of
business cycles on product-level applied tariffs. Panel A uses the simple average MFN tariff
while Panel B uses the weighted average MFN tariff. Columns (1), (3) and (5) only control
for the lagged business cycle while columns (2), (4) and (6) expand the set of covariates to
include the country-level analogs of our baseline specification (see Table A2 for definitions).49
For the pooled sample and the developing country subsample, the business cycle coefficient is
positive but not statistically significant regardless of the specification. Thus, like Rose (2013),
we cannot reject the null hypothesis of acyclicality.50 While the business cycle coefficient is
positive and statistically significant for developed countries in column (5) of Panel B, this
result disappears when controlling for the lagged trend of log real GDP and the share of
imports from PTA partners (although the coefficient remains positive) and is non-existent
when measuring tariffs using simple average MFN tariffs. Thus, aggregating tariffs at the
49Note that Rose (2013) uses the contemporaneous rather than the lagged business cycle variable (although
our results in Table 6 are robust to using the contemporaneous business cycle).
50The estimated coefficients on the applied tariff variable in Rose (2013, p.577) are generally negative
when only the business cycle variable is included but are not statistically significant. When additional
covariates are included, the coefficients vary in sign but remain statistically insignificant.
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national level appears to conceal cyclicality that emerges at the product level, where decision-
making over trade policy typically takes place.
[Table 6 about here.]
6 A terms of trade explanation
So far, we have documented a robust finding that applied MFN tariffs appear pro-cyclical in
developing countries. We now explore whether terms of trade motivations can explain this
result. To begin, we outline the theoretical motivations guiding our empirical investigation.
6.1 Theoretical motivations
As is well known, the standard formula for a country's (non-cooperative) optimal tariff when
maximizing national welfare is to set the ad-valorem tariff equal to the inverse export supply
elasticity (e.g. Feenstra (2003, p.220)). Defining market power as the inverse export supply
elasticity, optimal tariffs will then be pro-cyclical if and only if market power is pro-cyclical.
Intuitively, this pro-cyclical market power could be driven by pro-cyclical shifts of the import
demand curve onto more inelastic parts of the export supply curve during booms.
If pro-cyclical tariffs result from the impact of pro-cyclical market power on optimal tar-
iffs, we should observe two relationships in the data. First, to the extent that the variation in
market power across country-product pairs is large relative to the temporal variation in mar-
ket power within country-product pairs, pro-cyclicality should only be present for country-
product pairs with relatively high levels of time-invariant market power. For countries with
little market power, any increased market power conferred by booms is likely insufficient
to justify raising tariffs, especially if there are costs to changing tariffs (e.g. administrative
costs, as argued by Bown and Crowley (2013b, p.1076)).51
Second, Nicita et al. (2013, p.13) show that, theoretically, an importing country's product-
level market power is proportional to the importing country's product-level share of world
imports. This links temporal fluctuations in an importer's share of world imports to temporal
fluctuations in an importer's tariff. Indeed, if changing a tariff imposes some cost (e.g.
administrative costs) then we expect to empirically observe applied tariff fluctuations only
for sufficiently large fluctuations in an importer's share of world imports.
An alternative theoretical perspective to the standard static optimal tariff formula dis-
cussed above is the repeated game environment of Bagwell and Staiger (1990). In their model,
51In our empirical analysis, we use the time-invariant market power measures of Nicita et al. (2013).
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the optimal cooperative tariff balances the tension between a country's myopic incentive to
exploit its market power by manipulating its terms of trade and a country's anticipation
that doing so will instigate a tariff war. As shown by Bown and Crowley (2013b), the key
empirical prediction of the model is that temporal fluctuations in tariffs should be positively
related to temporal fluctuations in imports only if a country has sufficiently high market
power and tariffs generate sufficiently low efficiency losses. The intuition rests on two ideas.
First, import surges strengthen the importing country's motivation to improve its terms of
trade by setting an optimal (non-cooperative) tariff. The only way to avoid the resulting
tariff war is to neutralize the increased terms of trade incentive by temporarily raising the
cooperative applied tariff. Second, the benefit of raising a tariff is higher when the efficiency
costs imposed by a tariff are smaller and the terms of trade gain from imposing a tariff is
larger. This happens when, from an importer's view, its own import demand curve and the
export supply curve it faces are both more inelastic.
The Bagwell and Staiger (1990) model thus offers the third implication investigated below.
To the extent imports are pro-cyclical, we expect to observe pro-cyclical tariffs only when (i)
imports deviate substantially from their usual level and (ii) the importer faces a sufficiently
inelastic export supply curve and has a sufficiently inelastic import demand curve.
6.2 Empirical results
Given the theoretical terms of trade motivations outlined above, we investigate three em-
pirical relationships. Before doing so, we note that imports are indeed pro-cyclical in our
sample. Regressing detrended log real imports on the business cycle yields a positive coeffi-
cient and reveals the average business cycle fluctuation between the trough of the recession
and the peak of the boom explains about 15% of a standard deviation of detrended log real
imports.52 This correlation is important given our intuition behind exploring a terms of
trade argument for our pro-cyclical tariff result is driven by the idea of pro-cyclical imports.
First, we consider the link between tariff cyclicality and the Nicita et al. (2013) measure
of time-invariant market power. To the extent that the variation in market power across
country-product pairs substantially exceeds the temporal variation in market power within
a country-product pair, we expect to observe pro-cyclical tariffs only for country-product
pairs with high market power. We use the baseline sample to compute thresholds for the
33rd and 66th percentiles of the market power distribution and label country-product pairs
in these upper and lower terciles as low and high market power observations, respectively.
We then compare cyclicality across these terciles.
52The OLS regression of ∆IMi,j,t−1 on BCi,t−1, using the same fixed effects and clustering as in our
baseline analysis, yields a point estimate on BCi,t−1 of 2.52 which is statistically significant at the 1% level.
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Columns (1)-(4) of Table 7 present the results of this comparison. Column (2) shows that
tariffs are pro-cyclical in developing countries when the time-invariant measure of market
power is high. Conversely, the remaining columns show acyclical tariffs for country-product
pairs in developing countries with low time-invariant market power and, regardless of market
power, country-product pairs in developed countries. Thus, the pro-cyclicality of tariffs in
our baseline sample is driven not by all products in developing countries but rather by those
country-product pairs that have high values of our time-invariant market power measure.
[Table 7 about here.]
Table 8 further describes these high market power, developing country observations from
column (2) of Table 7. Panel A lists the 10 countries with the largest share of such observa-
tions. These 10 countries fit well with the empirical stylized fact that larger countries tend to
have larger market power (e.g. Broda et al. (2008)).53 Panel B of Table 8 restricts attention
to those developing country observations with market power above the 66th percentile of
market power in developed countries, thus focusing on a set of products with high market
power even by developed country standards. 69% of the observations in column (2) of Table
7 meet this criterion. Panel B of Table 8 lists the 10 most frequent 2-digit HS chapters in
this group. Chapters 84 and 85 comprise Section XVI of the HS system: Machinery and Me-
chanical Appliances; Electrical Equipment. Chapters 72 and 73 represent the steel products
portion of Section XV: Base Metals. Chapters 28 and 29 represent the chemical products
portion of Section VI: Chemical and Allied Products.
We are not the first to suggest that developing countries may recognize and act upon
their international market power. Broda et al. (2008) analyze a sample of 15 non-WTO
members, only one of which is developed, and find that market power explains more of the
tariff variation in these countries than tariff revenue or lobbying variables. Importantly, as
Broda et al. (2008) emphasize, the empirical role of market power is not synonymous with
welfare maximizing developing country governments. Rather, it can emerge even in a Gross-
man and Helpman (1995) setting where governments care only about lobbying contributions
(alternately, bribes from industry). Moreover, we have shown that (i) numerous large de-
veloping countries have product-level market power even by developed country standards of
high market power (Table 8), (ii) developing countries have enough water in the tariff to
allow cyclical changes in applied tariffs (Table A3), and (iii) such changes are not an overly
rare occurrence (Table 1). Thus, prior literature, theoretical settings where governments
care about market power, and a substantial potential for tariff variation lend credence to our
result that pro-cyclical market power could drive pro-cyclical tariffs in developing countries.
53Moreover, 7 of the 10 developing countries with the largest shares of low market power observations do
not appear in Panel A.
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[Table 8 about here.]
Moving beyond the role of time-invariant market power, we now investigate the link
between temporal fluctuations in tariffs and temporal fluctuations in market power as proxied
by the importer's share of world imports.54 For developing country-product pairs in the top
tercile of time-invariant market power, we expect to find temporal tariff fluctuations for a
product only when there are sufficiently large fluctuations in the importer's time-varying
market power as measured by their share of world imports for that product.
Letting IM sharei,j,t =
IMi,j,t
IMWORLD,j,t
denote importer i's share of world imports in product j and
year t, we define the fluctuation in world import share, m˜i,j,t ≡ IM sharei,j,t−1− 1T
∑2011
t=2000 IM
share
i,j,t−1,
as the lagged deviation of the share of world imports from its usual level.55 Using this
measure, we further separate the high time-invariant market power products in developing
countries into two subsamples. First, country-product observations that lie in either the top
or bottom terciles of the empirical distribution over m˜i,j,t; these observations are experiencing
a substantial temporal deviation in their share of world imports. Second, country-product
observations that lie in the middle tercile of the distribution of m˜i,j,t, which are experiencing
only a minimal temporal deviation in their share of world imports.
Columns (5)-(7) of Table 7 confirm our expectation. Column (7) clearly shows that, for
developing country-product pairs with high time-invariant market power, we cannot reject
the null that an importer's tariffs are acyclical when the product is subject to minimal
temporal deviations in its share of world imports (i.e. in the middle tercile of the m˜i,j,t
distribution). Conversely, column (6) reveals that the magnitude of pro-cyclicality is more
than three times larger for a country-product pair that is experiencing substantial temporal
fluctuations in its share of world imports (i.e. in the top or bottom tercile of the m˜i,j,t
distribution) and easily statistically significant at the 5% level (p = .029). Thus, tariff pro-
cyclicality is evident in the subset of high time-invariant market power products in developing
countries that are experiencing large deviations in their share of world imports relative to
their country-product average. In turn, the mechanism behind our pro-cyclical tariff result
is consistent with a pro-cyclical market power mechanism via the proportionality of time-
varying market power and world import share.
The third empirical implication we investigate stems from the Bown and Crowley (2013b)
analysis of the Bagwell and Staiger (1990) theoretical model. According to Bown and Crowley
(2013b), we should expect temporal fluctuations in imports to influence tariffs only when an
importer's import demand curve is sufficiently inelastic and it faces a sufficiently inelastic
54Indeed, Beshkar et al. (2015) use an importer's share of world imports as an alternative measure of
market power in addition to the Nicita et al. (2013) measures.
55T denotes the number of years that country i and product j appear in our sample.
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export supply curve. Like Bown and Crowley (2013b), we use the inverse sum of these
elasticities 1
exi,j+|emi,j| to capture this idea.
56 Thus, when we look within country-product pairs
that have high values of 1
exi,j+|emi,j| , we only expect to find temporal fluctuations in tariffs when
there are substantial fluctuations in imports. To explore this prediction, we use the overall
sample to compute the threshold for the 66th percentile of the distribution over 1
exi,j+|emi,j| and
label observations in the top tercile of the distribution as having high values of 1
exi,j+|emi,j| .
Also using the overall sample, we now redefine m˜i,j,t ≡ ∆IMi,j,t−1 − 1T
∑2011
t=2000 ∆IMi,j,t−1
as importer i's lagged deviation of detrended log real imports for product j in year t from
its usual level and label observations that lie in either the top or bottom tercile of the
empirical distribution over m˜i,j,t as those experiencing substantial temporal fluctuations in
imports.57
Columns (8)-(10) of Table 8 present the results and confirm our expectation (per Bown
and Crowley (2013b), we also control for ∆IMi,j,t−1 and the volatility of ∆IMi,j,t−1).58 The
point estimate is only statistically significant for observations experiencing substantial tem-
poral deviations in imports (column (9), at the 5% level) and, again, the point estimate for
these observations is roughly three times larger than observations experiencing minimal tem-
poral deviations in imports.59 Thus, our pro-cyclical tariff result in developing countries is
consistent with an interpretation of the Bagwell and Staiger (1990) model where pro-cyclical
imports lead to temporary increases in applied tariffs that prevent tariff wars.
Columns (2), (6) and (9) of Table 7 focus on the subset of developing country observations
where pro-cyclical market power could drive pro-cyclical applied tariffs via terms of trade
theory. How does the economic magnitude of the business cycle in these situations compare
with the effect in the full developing country subsample in Table 4? Based on column (0) of
Table 4, the average movement in developing countries between the peak and trough of the
business cycle accounts for 15.35% of the average change in the applied tariff in developing
countries. Based on column (2) of Table 7, which only uses products in developing countries
with high time-invariant market power, this share rises to 18.49% (a 20.5% increase over the
baseline 15.35% share). Based on column (6) which narrows the focus further to observations
56Panel B of Table A6 in the Appendix shows the results are robust to alternative functional forms that
capture sufficiently inelastic import demand and export supply.
57Log real imports exhibit a substantial trend over our sample period and hence we use detrended real
imports rather than the level of real imports to determine unusual deviations. First differencing is a simple
detrending method.
58Lack of data on import demand elasticities and trade data in consecutive years causes the number of
observations in columns (8)-(10) to drop below that in columns (5)-(7).
59Panels A and B of Table 8 document the most frequent countries and HS chapters based on the
observations in column (2) of Table 7. An analogous exercise based on column (6) or (9) of Table 7 reveals
only minor differences in the dominant countries and chapters.
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with large changes in time-varying market power, this share rises to 28.34% (an 84.70%
increase over baseline). Finally, based on column (9), which focuses on country-product pairs
in developing countries most susceptible to mitigating tariff wars via temporary applied tariff
increases, this share rises to 19.99% (a 30.26% increase over baseline). Ultimately, as one
would expect from terms of trade theory, the economic magnitude underlying the results in
Table 7 is noticeably larger than the full developing country subsample.
Finally, one may be concerned with the robustness of the results in Table 7 given our
finding in Tables 3-4 regarding business cycle outliers. While removing business cycle out-
liers did not alter the estimated degree of tariff pro-cyclicality in Tables 3-4, it did reduce
the precision of our estimates such that the business cycle coefficient was not statistically
significant at the 10% level. We now revisit this issue given that terms of trade theory pro-
vides guidance, confirmed by our empirical results, on where one should expect to find tariff
pro-cyclicality. Specifically, we now repeat the analysis in Table 7 but exclude the business
cycle outliers. Panel A of Table A6 in the Appendix presents the results. Columns (2), (6)
and (9) show that removing business cycle outliers does not diminish the estimated degree of
tariff pro-cyclicality; indeed, the estimated degree of pro-cyclicality actually rises by about
16-25%. More importantly, while estimates become less precise, the business cycle coefficient
remains statistically significant at the 10% level in columns (2) and (9) and at the 5% level
in column (6). Thus, when one looks for tariff pro-cyclicality guided by the above theoretical
motivations, the pro-cyclicality is robust to excluding business cycle outliers.
7 Conclusion
Conventional wisdom says that applied tariffs are counter-cyclical. Using a product-level
panel dataset with 72 countries over the years 2000-2011, our results suggest the opposite:
applied tariffs are pro-cyclical. While our results are consistent with other recent work
in various contexts suggesting that applied tariffs are not counter-cyclical (Gawande et al.
(2014), Kee et al. (2013) and Rose (2013)), our results go further than previous work because
we find evidence of applied tariff pro-cyclicality.
These results are robust to controlling for numerous variables emphasized in the recent
theoretical and empirical literature as important determinants of applied tariffs, using al-
ternative samples and sample periods, and using alternative measures of the business cycle.
Further, we find that the pro-cyclical applied tariff result is driven by the tariff setting behav-
ior of developing countries, and applied tariffs are actually acyclical in developed countries.
We present evidence that terms of trade motivations drive pro-cyclical tariffs in developing
countries. Intuitively, this could arise from pro-cyclical imports shifting the import demand
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curve up onto a more inelastic part of the export supply curve during booms and thereby
generating pro-cyclical market power. First, we only observe pro-cyclicality for country-
product pairs with high time-invariant market power. Second, looking within these high
market power country-product pairs but using temporal fluctuations in the share of world
imports to proxy for time varying market power, we only observe pro-cyclicality in country-
product years where a country's share of product-level world imports varies sufficiently to
make the tariff change worthwhile. Third, in response to import surges, we observe pro-
cyclicality only in country-product-years where both time-invariant market power is high
and the efficiency costs of tariffs are low, as one would expect based on Bagwell and Staiger
(1990) and Bown and Crowley (2013b). Overall, this evidence adds to a growing literature,
in both static and dynamic settings, documenting the impact that terms of trade motivations
have on trade policy.
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Figure 1: Temporal pattern of applied tariff changes
Notes: The sample used is as described in Section 3.1. The global business cycle in panel B is a simple
weighted average of the values of BCi,t−1 in the sample.
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Figure 2: Preliminary evidence that applied tariffs could be pro-cyclical
Notes: All figures include only observations for products where the applied tariff moves both up and down
over the sample period. Only those observations where the applied tariff changed relative to the prior year
are included. For the overall sample description, see Section 3.1. For further details, see Section 3.2.
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Table 1: Frequency and magnitude of applied tariff changes
A. Frequency and magnitude of applied tariff changes at country-product-year level
Pooled Developing Developed
Ave. Ave. Ave.
N % size N % size N % size
Unchanged 1,809,232 88.71 1,190,552 86.57 618,680 93.13
Changed 230,338 11.29 -2.05 184,703 13.43 -2.30 45,635 6.87 -1.04
Total 2,039,570 100 1,375,255 100 664,315 100
B. Frequency and magnitude of directional applied tariff changes at country-product-year level
Pooled Developing Developed
Ave. Ave. Ave.
N % size N % size N % size
Applied tariff decrease 183,310 8.99 -3.65 146,558 10.66 -4.13 36,752 5.53 -1.73
Applied tariff unchanged 1,809,232 88.71 1,190,552 86.57 618,680 93.13
Applied tariff increase 47,028 2.31 4.17 38,145 2.77 4.73 8,883 1.34 1.81
Total 2,039,570 100 1,375,255 100 664,315 100
C. Frequency of directional applied tariff changes at country-product level
Pooled Developing Developed
Ave. Ave. Ave.
N % size N % size N % size
Applied tariff only decreases 60,602 26.35 -3.42 48,738 30.97 -3.93 11,864 16.35 -1.66
Applied tariff always unchanged 134,267 58.38 80,961 51.44 53,306 73.45
Applied tariff only increases 9,243 4.02 3.76 5,641 3.58 5.02 3,602 4.96 1.25
Applied tariff increases and decreases 25,858 11.24 -0.83 22,055 14.01 -0.92 3,803 5.24 -0.28
Total 229,970 100 157,395 100 72,575 100
Notes: The sample used is that described in Section 3.1.
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Table 2: Cyclicality of tariffs
A. Fixed effects OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
BCi,t−1 6.969 1.302 5.004 7.512‡ 7.512‡ 7.490‡ 8.277‡ 8.350‡
(9.488) (3.105) (4.088) (4.443) (4.443) (4.443) (4.617) (4.621)
yi,t−1 -4.115† -4.115† -4.127† -5.758* -5.821*
(1.663) (1.663) (1.665) (2.106) (2.108)
MPi,j 0.001 0.001 0.018 -0.005
(0.009) (0.009) (1.077) (0.008)
PTA_IMi,j,t 0.228‡ 0.138 0.131
(0.133) (0.215) (0.153)
N 2272198 2272117 2272117 2272117 2272117 2272117 1491752 1491752
R2 0.0001 0.8528 0.8561 0.8565 0.8565 0.8565 0.8564
Country-HS4 FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Underidentification p-value 0.011
Weak instrument rk F stat 4.667
Overidentification p value 0.088
Regressor endogeneity p-value 0.981
B. Fixed effects PPML
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BCi,t−1 0.893‡ 0.167 0.628‡ 0.875‡ 0.875‡ 0.875‡
(0.520) (0.285) (0.378) (0.469) (0.469) (0.469)
yi,t−1 -0.546 -0.546 -0.546
(0.503) (0.503) (0.503)
MPi,j 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
PTA_IMi,j,t 0.001
(0.034)
N 2272198 1821840 1821840 1821840 1821840 1821840
R2 0.0002 0.6800 0.6867 0.6873 0.6873 0.6873
Country-HS4 FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The sample is that described in Section 3.1. OLS standard errors are two-way clustered standard
errors, clustering at country-year and country-HS4 level. PPML standard errors clustered at country level.
Market power is treated as endogenous in Panel A column (7); the instruments are the average import
demand elasticity of other countries and the global average export supply elasticity from the perspective
of the exporter.
‡ p < 0.10, † p < 0.05, * p < 0.01
38
Table 3: Robustness: alternative samples
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
BCi,t−1 0.875‡ 1.019† 0.911† 1.047† 0.928‡ 0.967 0.841‡ 1.186† 0.649‡ 1.018†
(0.469) (0.497) (0.436) (0.510) (0.478) (0.657) (0.483) (0.583) (0.343) (0.480)
yi,t−1 -0.546 -0.583 -0.553 -0.708 -0.665 -0.540 -0.455 -0.618 -0.582‡ -0.820†
(0.503) (0.542) (0.465) (0.593) (0.568) (0.507) (0.543) (0.533) (0.326) (0.345)
MPi,j 0.000 -0.001‡ 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.0000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
PTA_IMi,j,t 0.001 -0.010 -0.021 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.007 -0.011 0.126†
(0.034) (0.042) (0.038) (0.036) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.031) (0.031) (0.057)
N 1821840 1679003 1242745 1597500 1737672 1787685 1377853 1509186 2311682 2720272
R2 0.6873 0.6606 0.7178 0.6983 0.6902 0.6880 0.6418 0.6920 0.6698 0.6584
Country-HS4 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Estimation performed by fixed effects PPML. Standard errors clustered at country level. Column (0) reports
baseline results from Column (6) of Table 2. Columns (1)-(9) implement the following modifications:
(1) Excludes agriculture.
(2) Excludes HS6 lines with more than one product.
(3) Excludes new WTO members.
(4) Excludes EU and China.
(5) Excludes business cycle observations in the top and bottom 1% of the business cycle distribution.
(6) Excludes observations with (i) negative overhang or observations where the tariff drops back below
the binding and (ii) country-product pairs with non-constant binding, no binding or zero binding.
(7) Excludes Great Recession years (2010 and 2011).
(8) Extends sample back to 1995 by adding country-product pairs to baseline sample that always experience
weakly positive overhang during country-product specific phase-in years.
(9) Extends sample in (8) by adding country-product-year observations for 1989-1994.
‡ p < 0.10, † p < 0.05, * p < 0.01
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Table 4: Cyclicality of tariffs by level of development
A. Developing countries
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
BCi,t−1 0.933‡ 1.086† 0.953† 1.129† 0.995† 1.037 0.931‡ 1.243† 0.683‡ 1.348*
(0.479) (0.504) (0.438) (0.512) (0.486) (0.685) (0.504) (0.598) (0.355) (0.464)
yi,t−1 -0.710 -0.764 -0.745 -0.984 -0.928 -0.692 -0.633 -0.770 -0.758† -1.107*
(0.630) (0.666) (0.562) (0.746) (0.696) (0.632) (0.719) (0.638) (0.360) (0.303)
MPi,j -0.001 -0.001‡ 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001‡ -0.001‡ -0.001*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
PTA_IMi,j,t -0.006 -0.019 -0.030 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.002 0.000 -0.010 0.140†
(0.035) (0.044) (0.039) (0.037) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.033) (0.032) (0.059)
N 1391693 1290034 986096 1186831 1355607 1364167 1059446 1148486 1790695 2021180
R2 0.6221 0.5960 0.6555 0.6267 0.6249 0.6237 0.6164 0.6270 0.5920 0.5944
B. Developed countries
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
BCi,t−1 -0.212 -0.371 -0.436 -0.255 -0.254 -0.114 -0.037 0.266 -0.261 -0.958
(0.484) (0.533) (0.566) (0.543) (0.510) (0.586) (0.410) (0.619) (0.532) (0.640)
yi,t−1 0.144 0.187 0.203 0.144 0.225 0.152 0.129 0.107 0.267 0.233
(0.157) (0.175) (0.175) (0.162) (0.157) (0.163) (0.156) (0.171) (0.237) (0.244)
MPi,j 0.003 -0.001 0.007 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.001
(0.006) (0.001) (0.011) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
PTA_IMi,j,t 0.079† 0.091* 0.068* 0.080† 0.085† 0.080† 0.048‡ 0.081† 0.076‡ 0.078‡
(0.034) (0.028) (0.022) (0.035) (0.038) (0.034) (0.025) (0.033) (0.040) (0.046)
N 430147 388969 256649 410669 382065 423518 318407 360700 520987 699092
R2 0.7333 0.6892 0.7585 0.7394 0.7437 0.7333 0.6486 0.7326 0.7304 0.6921
Notes: Overall sample, before splitting into developed and developing countries, is same as Table 2. Column (0)
reports results for all developing countries (Panel A) and developed countries (Panel B). Columns (1)-(9) mirror
those in Table 3 (see Table 3 for descriptions). Estimation performed by fixed effects PPML. Standard errors
clustered at country level. All specifications contain country-HS4 and year fixed effects.
‡ p < 0.10, † p < 0.05, * p < 0.01
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Table 5: Robustness: alternative covariates
Developing Developed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
BCi,t−1 1.024† 0.953† 0.953† 0.939‡ -0.381 -0.325 -0.465 -0.213
(0.505) (0.471) (0.462) (0.486) (0.479) (0.490) (0.500) (0.483)
∆IMi,j,t−1 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
sd∆IMi,j,t−1 -0.001 0.056
(0.003) (0.035)
GBCi,t−1 -2.583 5.689‡
(2.070) (3.394)
Intermedj -0.102* -0.070*
(0.030) (0.025)
Intermedj ×BCi,t−1 -0.045 0.561
(0.212) (0.596)
TTBi,j,t 0.111† 0.043*
(0.053) (0.008)
TTBi,j,t ×BCi,t−1 -0.903 0.105
(0.557) (0.467)
N 1221794 1391693 1351921 1391693 383291 430147 417703 430147
R2 0.6173 0.6222 0.6246 0.6222 0.7369 0.7334 0.7339 0.7333
Notes: Estimation performed by fixed effects PPML. All specifications include market power,
PTA import share and lagged trend of log real GDP as controls and year and country-HS4
fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the country level.
‡ p < 0.10, † p < 0.05, * p < 0.01
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Table 6: Cyclicality of country-level aggregate tariffs
A. Simple average tariff
Overall Developing Developed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BCi,t−1 0.115 0.406 0.108 0.387 0.405 0.217
(0.315) (0.301) (0.334) (0.315) (0.425) (0.678)
yi,t−1 -14.370‡ -18.204‡ 1.658
(8.044) (9.606) (4.259)
PTA_IMi,t -0.264 -0.253 -0.654*
(0.168) (0.172) (0.138)
N 715 715 562 562 153 153
R2 0.892 0.901 0.848 0.861 0.901 0.981
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
B. Weighted average tariff
Overall Developing Developed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BCi,t−1 0.441 0.600 0.238 0.502 2.405† 1.719
(0.470) (0.462) (0.484) (0.471) (1.146) (1.228)
yi,t−1 -8.407 -16.031 10.467
(9.219) (12.136) (7.990)
PTA_IMi,t 0.064 0.044 -0.017
(0.182) (0.187) (0.391)
N 608 608 461 461 147 147
R2 0.867 0.869 0.820 0.826 0.878 0.881
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The country-year pairs included in the sample correspond to the
country-year pairs in the sample of Table 2. Estimation performed by
fixed effects PPML. Standard errors clustered by country.
‡ p < 0.10, † p < 0.05, * p < 0.01
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Table 7: Cyclicality of tariffs: market power and import fluctuations
Low High Low High Extreme Middle Extreme Middle
MP MP MP MP All terciles tercile All terciles tercile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
BCi,t−1 0.587 1.116‡ -0.118 0.051 1.248† 1.642† 0.585 1.040‡ 1.233† 0.432
(0.389) (0.574) (0.645) (0.400) (0.609) (0.756) (0.506) (0.612) (0.584) (0.803)
ln
(
IMsharei,j,t−1
)
-0.011† -0.011‡ -0.007†
(0.004) (0.007) (0.003)
∆IMi,j,t−1 -0.001 -0.002 0.026
(0.002) (0.002) (0.032)
sd∆IMi,j,t−1 -0.012 -0.014† 0.000
(0.007) (0.007) (0.016)
N 539720 373164 85933 217920 343942 228845 108706 274263 183605 87251
R2 0.6528 0.6664 0.7657 0.7235 0.6628 0.6564 0.7333 0.637 0.6602 0.6643
Definitions
All developing All developed Country-product pairs in Country-product pairs in
Overall sample countries countries developing countries that lie developing countries that lie
in top tercile of MPi,j in top tercile of
[
exi,j +
∣∣∣emi,j∣∣∣]−1
m˜i,j,t N/A IMsharei,j,t−1 − 1T
∑2011
t=2000 IM
share
i,j,t−1 ∆IMi,j,t−1 − 1T
∑2011
t=2000 ∆IMi,j,t−1
Extreme terciles N/A Observations that lie in top or bottom terciles of m˜i,j,t
Middle tercile N/A Observations that lie in middle tercile of m˜i,j,t
Notes: Estimation performed by fixed effects PPML. All specifications include market power, PTA import
share and lagged trend of log real GDP as controls and year and country-HS4 fixed effects. Standard
errors clustered at the country level.
‡ p < 0.10, † p < 0.05, * p < 0.01
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Table 8: Developing countries and market power
A. Top 10 developing countries with high market power
% of high market power
Country developing country obs. Country % of own obs. as high market power
Mexico 6.97% China 59.72%
China 5.89% Mexico 49.98%
Brazil 4.37% Thailand 37.39%
Indonesia 4.04% India 33.65%
Thailand 4.00% Brazil 32.59%
India 3.76% Indonesia 30.79%
Turkey 3.74% Turkey 28.22%
Venezuela 3.03% Bangladesh 27.00%
Philippines 2.99% Oman 25.75%
Chile 2.95% Philippines 25.50%
B. Top 10 sectors in developing countries with high market power
% of high market power Average % of all HS
HS 2-digit sector developing country obs. market power tariff lines Sector Description
84 9.52% 0.352 9.81% Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and
mechanical appliances; parts thereof
85 5.30% 0.206 6.54% Electrical machinery, equipment, parts;
sound recorders, reproducers; television
image and sound recorders, reproducers,
parts, accessories
29 3.74% 0.309 6.72% Organic chemicals
73 3.33% 0.078 2.49% Articles of iron or steel
72 3.00% 0.381 3.82% Iron and steel
39 2.75% 0.101 2.34% Plastics and articles thereof
90 2.56% 0.161 3.58% Optical, photographic, cinematographic,
measuring, checking, precision, medical
or surgical instruments and apparatus;
parts and accessories thereof
48 2.06% 0.148 2.45% Paper and paperboard; articles of paper
pulp, of paper or of paperboard
28 1.96% 0.189 3.19% Inorganic chemicals; organic or
inorganic compounds of precious
metals, of rare-earth metals, of
radioactive elements or of isotopes
87 1.66% 0.090 1.40% Vehicles other than railway or tramway
rolling-stock, and parts and accessories thereof
Notes: The overall sample used is that from column (2) of Table 7.
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Table A1: Countries in our dataset
Developed (16)
All tariff years and all GDP years (7)
Australia, Canada, European Union, Japan, Norway, Singapore, United States
Only missing GDP years (5)
Brunei (1960-1973), Hong Kong (1960-1964), Macao (1960-1981), New Zealand (1960-1976),
Switzerland (1960-1979)
Only missing tariff years (2)
Iceland (2002), Israel (2010)
Missing GDP years and tariff years (2)
Qatar (missing GDP years 1960-1969, 2013; missing tariff years 2000-2001),
Saudi Arabia (missing GDP years 1960-1967; missing tariff year 2010; joined WTO 12/11/2005)
Developing (51)
All tariff years and all GDP years (22)
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Madagascar, Malaysia,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Togo, Turkey, Venezuela,
Ecuador (joined WTO 1/21/1996), Nepal (joined WTO 4/23/2004), Panama (joined WTO 9/6/1997)
Only missing GDP years (7)
Cuba (1960-1969, 2012-2013), Egypt (1960-1964), El Salvador (1960-1964),
Albania (1960-1979; joined WTO 9/8/2000), Georgia (1960-1964, joined WTO 6/14/2000),
Macedonia FYR (1960-1989; joined WTO 4/4/2003), Mongolia (1960-1980; joined WTO 1/29/1997)
Only missing tariff years (17)
Bangladesh (2001), Bolivia (2011), Cameroon (2000), Central African Republic (2000), Cote d'Ivoire (2000),
Gabon (2006), Ghana (2005-2006, 2011), Guyana (2004-2005), India (2003), Kenya (2003), Niger (2000),
Papua New Guinea (2011), Senegal (2000), Sri Lanka (2002), Uruguay (2003), Zambia (2000),
China (missing tariff year 2011, joined WTO 12/11/2001)
Missing GDP and tariff years (5)
Jordan (missing GDP years 1960-1974; missing tariff year 2011; joined WTO 4/11/2000),
Mali (1960-1966; 2000-01), Mauritius (1960-1975; 2003), Tunisia (1960-1964; 2001, 2007),
Thailand (1960-1964; 2002)
Developed and developing (5)
Antigua & Barbuda (developing 2000-2001, 2003-2004, 2009; developed 2002,2005-2008;
missing GDP years 1960-1978, missing tariff year 2000),
Bahrain (developing 2000; developed 2001-2009; missing GDP years 1960-1979),
Korea (developing 2000; developed 2001-2009),
Oman (developing 2000-2006; developed 2007-2009, missing tariff years 2010-2011; joined WTO 11/9/2000),
Trinidad & Tobago (developing 2001-2005; developed 2006-2008; missing tariff years 2000, 2009)
Notes: Unless otherwise noted, years in parenthesis indicate missing years.
Level of development source: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/OGHIST.xls,
with developed being high-income and developing being not high-income.
New WTO member definition based on Beshkar et. al. (2015) with new members included in our regressions
in their first full year of WTO membership.
All tariff years = 2000-2011 and all GDP years = 1960-2013.
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Table A2: Variable definitions and sources
Variable Description Source
Tariff variables
τi,j,t Applied tariff of country i on product j in year t WTO Integrated Database and UNCTAD TRAINS
database (http://wits.worldbank.org/)
τ¯i,j,t Tariff binding of country i on product j in year t WTO Integrated Database (http://wits.worldbank.org/)
and new member accession schedules (http://www.
wto.org/english/tratop _e/schedules_e/
goods_schedules_table_e.htm)
Covariates
BCi,t−1 Cyclical component in year t− 1 of country i's log World Bank's World Development Indicators (http://
real GDP using Hodrick Prescott filter with real data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/
GDP measured in local currency units world-development-indicators);
yi,t−1 Trend component in year t− 1 of country i's log UN National Accounts Main Aggregates Database
real GDP using Hodrick Prescott filter with real (http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/introduction.asp);
GDP measured in local currency units Penn World Tables (https://pwt.sas.upenn.edu/)
MPi,j Natural log of 1/exi,j where e
x
i,j is the export supply Nicita et. al (2013)
elasticity of product j from the perspective of the
importer i
PTA_IMi,j,t Weighted share of country i's imports of product j COMTRADE (http://wits.worldbank.org/); NSF-Kellogg
in year t sourced from countries who are FTA Institute Data Base on Economic Integration Agreements
or CU partners of country i. The (time-invariant) (http://kellogg.nd.edu/faculty/fellows/bergstrand.shtml)
weights use import shares in product j from a year
prior to country i appearing in sample.
Intermedj = 1 if product j is an intermediate product, WITS (http://wits.worldbank.org/data/public/
= 0 otherwise concordance/Concordance_HS_to_BE.zip);
RIETI (http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/projects/)
rieti-tid/pdf/1503.pdf)
TTBi,j,t = 1 if product j is under a TTB in country i, year t, Bown (2010)
= 0 otherwise
GBCi,t−1 Trade weighted average of BCk,t−1 in countries other Same as for BCi,t−1; COMTRADE (http://wits.
than country i. The (time-invariant) weights are worldbank.org/)
import shares for the same year as the
(time-invariant) weights for PTA_IMi,j,t
∆IMi,j,t−1 Change in country i log real imports of product j COMTRADE (http://wits.worldbank.org/); http://data.
between t− 1 and t− 2 (100's million 2010 USD) worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL
sd∆IMi,j,t−1 Standard deviation of ∆IMi,j,t−1 over sample period
IMsharei,j,t−1 Country i 's share of world imports of product j
in year t
Instruments
ηIMi,j Global average of rest of the world (excluding country Nicita et. al. (2013)
i) product j import demand elasticity
ηEXj Global average of product j export supply elasticity
from perspective of exporters
Other
Unboundi,j,t = 1 if country i has no tariff binding on product j WTO Integrated Database (http://wits.worldbank.org/)
in year t, = 0 otherwise
ZeroBindingi,j,t = 1 if country i's tariff binding on product j
in year t is zero, = 0 otherwise
emi,j Import demand elasticity for importer i, product j Kee et. al. (2008)
Aggregate Data
τsimplei,t Simple average applied tariff of country i in year t WTO Integrated Database (http://wits.worldbank.org/)
τweightedi,t Weighted average applied tariff of country i in year t
PTA_IMi,t Weighted share of country i's imports in year t Same as for PTA_IMi,j,t
sourced from countries who are FTA or CU partners
of country i. The (time-invariant) weights use import
shares from a year prior to country i appearing
in sample.
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Table A3: Summary statistics
All countries
N Mean St. Dev. Min. Max.
Tariff variables
τi,j,t 2272198 7.861 14.334 0 3000
τ¯i,j,t 1876855 22.441 22.984 0 3000
Covariates
BCi,t−1 2272198 -0.001 0.020 -0.135 0.089
yi,t−1 2272198 27.767 3.024 21.486 35.381
MPi,j 2272198 -2.722 3.116 -11.401 21.723
PTA_IMi,j,t 2272198 0.287 0.364 0 1
Intermedj 2209301 0.559 0.497 0 1
TTBi,j,t 2272198 0.012 0.107 0 1
GBCi,t−1 2272198 0.000 0.013 -0.050 0.032
∆IMi,j,t−1 2006312 0.056 1.015 -14.094 16.299
sd∆IMi,j,t−1 2197317 0.821 0.796 0.000 15.318
IMsharei,j,t−1 2085867 0.017 0.050 0 1
Instruments
ηIMi,j 1559363 1.559 2.202 0 28.906
ηEXj 1618600 36.696 170.840 0.442 6800.288
Other
Unboundi,j,t 2272198 0.174 0.379 0 1
ZeroBindingi,j,t 2272198 0.105 0.307 0 1
emi,j 1707777 -3.396 15.043 -372.246 0.000
Aggregate data
τsimplei,t 763 8.637 5.483 0.000 33.710
τweightedi,t 656 6.467 4.246 0.000 24.540
BCi,t−1 763 -0.001 0.020 -0.114 0.089
yi,t−1 763 27.262 2.962 21.517 35.381
PTA_IMi,t 763 0.290 0.255 0.000 0.896
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Table A3 (cont): Summary statistics by level of development
Developed Developing
N Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. N Mean St. Dev. Min. Max.
Tariff variables
τi,j,t 737790 3.374 9.499 0 800.300 1534408 10.018 15.701 0 3000
τ¯i,j,t 643606 8.940 14.520 0.000 800.300 1233249 29.487 23.434 0.000 3000
Covariates
BCi,t−1 737790 0.000 0.019 -0.114 0.070 1534408 -0.001 0.020 -0.135 0.089
yi,t−1 737790 28.388 3.028 21.752 34.768 1534408 27.469 2.976 21.486 35.381
MPi,j 737790 -1.654 3.901 -10.913 21.723 1534408 -3.236 2.500 -11.401 20.734
PTA_IMi,j,t 737790 0.332 0.367 0 1 1534408 0.265 0.360 0 1
Intermedj 717318 0.546 0.498 0 1 1491983 0.565 0.496 0 1
TTBi,j,t 737790 0.016 0.126 0 1 1534408 0.009 0.097 0 1
GBCi,t−1 737790 0.000 0.012 -0.036 0.025 1534408 0.000 0.014 -0.050 0.032
∆IMi,j,t−1 658324 0.034 0.796 -13.774 14.047 1347988 0.067 1.106 -14.094 16.299
sd∆IMi,j,t−1 719470 0.626 0.669 0.000 15.318 1477847 0.916 0.835 0.000 14.467
IMsharei,j,t−1 681344 0.038 0.075 0.000 0.999 1404523 0.007 0.027 0.000 1.000
Instruments
ηIMi,j 551396 1.525 2.221 0.000 28.904 1007967 1.577 2.191 0.017 28.906
ηEXj 558589 43.539 216.145 0.442 6800.288 1060011 33.090 141.101 0.442 6800.288
Other
Unboundi,j,t 737790 0.128 0.334 0 1 1534408 0.196 0.397 0 1
ZeroBindingi,j,t 737790 0.270 0.444 0 1 1534408 0.026 0.160 0 1
emi,j 519215 -4.617 19.752 -366.046 0.000 1188562 -2.862 12.402 -372.246 0.000
Aggregate data
τsimplei,t 201 3.250 2.793 0.000 12.600 562 10.563 4.892 0.910 33.710
τweightedi,t 195 2.630 2.251 0.000 10.360 461 8.090 3.828 0.850 24.540
BCi,t−1 201 -0.001 0.021 -0.114 0.070 562 -0.001 0.020 -0.108 0.089
yi,t−1 201 27.767 3.133 21.752 34.768 562 27.082 2.881 21.517 35.381
PTA_IMi,t 201 0.374 0.268 0.000 0.850 562 0.260 0.244 0.000 0.896
Notes: See Table A2 for a description of variables and data sources.
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Table A4: Robustness: OLS specifications
A: Alternative samples
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
BCi,t−1 7.490‡ 8.726‡ 7.951‡ 9.571‡ 7.821‡ 9.657 7.387‡ 14.511* 6.214‡ 10.211
(4.443) (4.690) (4.254) (5.016) (4.517) (6.216) (4.390) (5.124) (3.674) (6.567)
yi,t−1 -4.127† -4.407† -3.975* -5.032† -4.557† -4.490† -3.833‡ -5.066† -4.378* -12.801*
(1.665) (1.791) (1.518) (1.997) (1.872) (1.783) (1.977) (2.087) (1.266) (3.879)
MPi,j 0.001 -0.007† 0.009 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.005 -0.002 0.0000 -0.006
(0.009) (0.003) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
PTA_IMi,j,t 0.228‡ 0.174 0.081 0.278‡ 0.250‡ 0.241‡ 0.145 0.228‡ 0.105 1.332*
(0.133) (0.146) (0.132) (0.147) (0.136) (0.134) (0.142) (0.133) (0.136) (0.408)
N 2272117 2082096 1650786 2029182 2179932 2229259 1561159 1885955 2783768 3102717
R2 0.8565 0.7693 0.9249 0.8623 0.8564 0.8564 0.8916 0.8482 0.8426 0.7519
B. Cyclicality of tariffs by level of development: developing countries
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
BCi,t−1 10.530‡ 11.955† 10.894† 14.798† 11.367† 12.828‡ 9.592‡ 17.170* 8.336‡ 15.404†
(5.571) (5.788) (5.325) (6.351) (5.637) (7.762) (5.193) (6.013) (4.708) (7.737)
yi,t−1 -7.763† -8.129† -8.080* -12.498* -10.533* -7.669† -6.197‡ -8.923† -8.367* -20.711*
(3.374) (3.505) (2.998) (4.498) (3.932) (3.418) (3.466) (3.802) (2.173) (5.363)
MPi,j -0.008 -0.009‡ 0.001 -0.010 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.010 -0.009 -0.016*
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
PTA_IMi,j,t 0.206 0.125 0.001 0.284 0.213 0.230 0.221 0.177 0.139 2.165*
(0.167) (0.179) (0.166) (0.186) (0.166) (0.169) (0.169) (0.168) (0.170) (0.547)
N 1534359 1425235 1127800 1312011 1496961 1505698 1152466 1268588 1886512 2075337
R2 0.8693 0.7335 0.9359 0.8774 0.8698 0.8695 0.9198 0.8560 0.8533 0.7678
C. Cyclicality of tariffs by level of development: developed countries
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
BCi,t−1 -0.258 -0.419 -0.210 -0.348 -0.263 0.141 -0.323 2.071 -0.182 -1.162
(1.250) (1.391) (1.233) (1.272) (1.252) (1.884) (2.206) (1.580) (1.485) (2.603)
yi,t−1 0.549† 0.587† 0.507‡ 0.555† 0.701† 0.556‡ 0.563 0.357 0.539‡ -0.235
(0.268) (0.291) (0.273) (0.270) (0.276) (0.306) (0.441) (0.382) (0.277) (0.690)
MPi,j 0.011 -0.005 0.019 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.033 0.008 0.011 0.005
(0.018) (0.003) (0.025) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.039) (0.016) (0.018) (0.014)
PTA_IMi,j,t 0.283* 0.320* 0.233* 0.284* 0.289* 0.286* 0.215* 0.283* 0.300* 0.423*
(0.054) (0.047) (0.043) (0.054) (0.057) (0.055) (0.072) (0.056) (0.068) (0.092)
N 737758 656861 522986 717171 682971 723561 408693 617367 897256 1027380
R2 0.7436 0.8310 0.7728 0.7434 0.7413 0.7429 0.6938 0.7537 0.7275 0.6716
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Table A4 (cont.). Robustness: OLS specifications
D. Alternative covariates
Developing Developed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
BCi,t−1 11.920‡ 11.090† 10.877† 10.572‡ -0.445 -0.364 -0.571 -0.258
(6.080) (5.617) (5.430) (5.550) (1.356) (1.276) (1.290) (1.249)
∆IMi,j,t−1 -0.021 -0.003
(0.015) (0.011)
sd∆IMi,j,t−1 -0.009 0.187
(0.020) (0.140)
GBCi,t−1 -34.571 16.822†
(22.064) (7.715)
Intermedj -0.808* -0.178*
(0.102) (0.056)
Intermedj ×BCi,t−1 -0.588 0.615
(2.441) (0.798)
TTBi,j,t 1.278* 0.166†
(0.366) (0.083)
TTBi,j,t ×BCi,t−1 -8.753 0.3170
(11.553) (2.351)
N 1343566 1534359 1491929 1534359 657218 737758 717282 737758
R2 0.8602 0.8693 0.8716 0.8693 0.7343 0.7436 0.7392 0.7436
E. Aggregate regressions: simple average tariff
Overall Developing Developed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BCi,t−1 1.212 3.409 1.394 4.162 1.083 0.410
(4.100) (4.116) (5.481) (5.415) (1.562) (1.601)
yi,t−1 -85.470* -187.920* 6.817
(25.557) (42.924) (6.948)
PTA_IMi,t -0.810 -1.561 0.470
(0.871) (1.089) (0.416)
N 763 763 562 562 201 201
R2 0.896 0.898 0.83 0.837 0.987 0.987
F. Aggregate regressions: weighted average tariff
Overall Developing Developed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BCi,t−1 3.074 3.585 2.910 4.743 5.441 3.734
(3.842) (3.880) (5.305) (5.319) (3.326) (3.361)
yi,t−1 -42.837‡ -125.945* 15.310
(24.763) (46.857) (15.046)
PTA_IMi,t 1.320‡ 0.881 1.515‡
(0.795) (1.017) (0.869)
N 656 656 461 461 195 195
R2 0.877 0.878 0.804 0.808 0.911 0.915
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Table A4 (cont.). Robustness: OLS specifications
G. Cyclicality of tariffs: market power and import fluctuations
Low High Low High Extreme Middle Extreme Middle
MP MP MP MP All terciles tercile All terciles tercile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
BCi,t−1 5.703 12.720‡ -0.089 0.099 14.298† 19.518† 5.816 11.806‡ 13.191† 8.063
(4.788) (6.675) (1.184) (1.307) (7.168) (9.112) (5.339) (6.840) (6.070) (8.690)
ln
(
IMsharei,j,t−1
)
-0.141* -0.146* -0.084*
(0.027) (0.039) (0.028)
∆IMi,j,t−1 -0.01 -0.017 0.234
(0.016) (0.015) (0.239)
sd∆IMi,j,t−1 -0.096 -0.117† 0.003
-0.059 -0.056 -0.119
N 615347 422058 145320 346623 387016 258244 125108 308443 208441 97574
R2 0.8945 0.9227 0.8709 0.8077 0.9239 0.8784 0.9823 0.8129 0.8245 0.8194
Definitions
All developing All developed Country-product pairs in Country-product pairs in
Overall sample countries countries developing countries that lie developing countries that lie
in top tercile of MPi,j in top tercile of
[
exi,j +
∣∣∣emi,j∣∣∣]−1
m˜i,j,t N/A IMsharei,j,t−1 − 1T
∑2011
t=2000 IM
share
i,j,t−1 ∆IMi,j,t−1 − 1T
∑2011
t=2000 ∆IMi,j,t−1
Extreme terciles N/A Observations that lie in extreme terciles of m˜i,j,t
Middle tercile N/A Observations that lie in middle tercile of m˜i,j,t
Notes: Estimation performed by fixed effects OLS. Panel D and G controls include market power, PTA import
share and lagged trend of log real GDP. Panels A-D and G include year and country-HS4 fixed effects,
Panels E-F include country and year fixed effects. Panels A-D and G use two-way clustered standard errors,
clustering by year and country-HS4 sectors. Panels E and F cluster standard errors at the country-level.
See analogous table in main text for further details.
‡ p < 0.10, † p < 0.05, * p < 0.01
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Table A5: Robustness: alternative definitions
Developing Developed Developing Developed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BCi,t−1 0.957† -0.290 1.089† 1.022† -0.172 -0.377
(0.487) (0.384) (0.518) (0.474) (0.492) (0.447)
yi,t−1 -0.721 0.183 -0.743 -0.683 0.141 0.144
(0.640) (0.132) (0.642) (0.618) (0.157) (0.146)
MPi,j -0.001 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.003
(0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006)
PTA_IMi,j,t -0.006 0.083* -0.006 -0.006 0.080† 0.080†
(0.036) (0.031) (0.036) (0.036) (0.034) (0.034)
N 1377737 443353 1391693 1391693 430147 430147
R2 0.6210 0.7384 0.6222 0.6221 0.7333 0.7333
Definitions
Development Time varying Time invariant
BC variable HP BK CF BK CF
Notes: Estimation performed by fixed effects PPML. Standard errors clustered
at the country-level. HP = Hodrick-Prescott filter, BK = Baxter-King filter,
CF = Christiano-Fitzgerald filter. See text for further details.
‡ p < 0.10, † p < 0.05, * p < 0.01
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Table A6: Terms of trade explanations: additional specifications
A. Excluding business cycle outliers
Low High Low High Extreme Middle Extreme Middle
MP MP MP MP All terciles tercile All terciles tercile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
BCi,t−1 0.571 1.364‡ 0.071 0.160 1.463‡ 2.085† 0.560 1.244 1.499‡ 0.603
(0.588) (0.796) (0.847) (0.489) (0.835) (1.031) (0.687) (0.889) (0.882) (1.014)
ln
(
IMsharei,j,t−1
)
-0.012* -0.012‡ -0.007†
(0.004) (0.007) (0.003)
∆IMi,j,t−1 -0.002 -0.002 0.030
(0.002) (0.002) (0.032)
sd∆IMi,j,t−1 -0.011 -0.014† 0.000
-0.007 -0.007 -0.016
N 538992 372565 72704 210085 342628 227301 110423 269647 179830 86384
R2 0.6541 0.6672 0.7816 0.7271 0.6638 0.6573 0.7335 0.6384 0.6624 0.6649
Definitions
All developing All developed Country-product pairs in Country-product pairs in
Overall sample countries countries developing countries that lie developing countries that lie
in top tercile of MPi,j in top tercile of
[
exi,j +
∣∣∣emi,j∣∣∣]−1
m˜i,j,t N/A IMsharei,j,t−1 − 1T
∑2011
t=2000 IM
share
i,j,t−1 ∆IMi,j,t−1 − 1T
∑2011
t=2000 ∆IMi,j,t−1
Extreme terciles N/A Observations that lie in top or bottom terciles of m˜i,j,t
Middle tercile N/A Observations that lie in middle tercile of m˜i,j,t
B. Alternative functional forms
Extreme Middle Extreme Middle
All terciles tercile All terciles tercile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BCi,t−1 1.028‡ 1.225† 0.420 1.122‡ 1.295† 0.532
(0.607) (0.580) (0.789) (0.642) (0.604) (0.836)
∆IMi,j,t−1 -0.002 -0.002 0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.006
(0.002) (0.002) (0.025) (0.002) (0.002) (0.020)
sd∆IMi,j,t−1 -0.015* -0.016* -0.009 -0.017* -0.020* 0.000
(0.006) (0.005) (0.014) (0.006) (0.006) (0.013)
N 276795 185162 88186 287323 191992 91883
R2 0.6380 0.6608 0.6662 0.6359 0.6577 0.6644
Definitions
Country-product pairs in Country-product pairs in
Overall sample developing countries that lie developing countries that lie in top
in top tercile of
[
exi,j ×
∣∣∣emi,j∣∣∣]−1 tercile of [ln(exi,j)+ ln(∣∣∣emi,j∣∣∣)]−1
m˜i,j,t ∆IMi,j,t−1 − 1T
∑2011
t=2000 ∆IMi,j,t−1
Extreme terciles Observations that lie in top and bottom terciles of m˜i,j,t
Middle tercile Observations that lie in middle tercile of m˜i,j,t
Notes: Estimation performed by fixed effects PPML. All specifications include controls for market power, PTA
import share and lagged trend of log real GDP and include year and country-HS4 fixed effects. Standard errors
clustered at country-level.
‡ p < 0.10, † p < 0.05, * p < 0.01
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